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JUSTICE DOUGLAS AND THE ROSENBERG
CASE: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT
William Cohent
In Cold War Justice: The Supreme Court and the Rosenbergs,1 Professor
Michael Parrish examines the Supreme Court's refusal to review the
convictions of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. A United States district
court had sentenced the Rosenbergs to death in 1951 for giving Ameri-
can atomic secrets to the Soviet Union. For Parrish, the Court's refusal
to act "suggested the terrible possibility of judicially sanctioned death
through error, bias, or deceit that would return to haunt the Supreme
Court and the American system of justice in the years ahead."' 2 His
unlikely candidate for the principal villain in these events is Justice Wil-
liam 0. Douglas.
Justice Douglas is a surprising choice, because it was he who
granted the last-minute stay of the Rosenbergs' execution.3 Further-
more, for many lawyers of the 1950s and 1960s, Hugo Black and Wil-
liam 0. Douglas were special heroes. "Black and Douglas, dissenting"
became a synonym for the lonely fight of the only two Justices on the
Court who consistently had the courage and foresight to stand up for
what was right during a period of national hysteria.4 Douglas's behav-
t C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Profes-
sor Catherine Hancock of the Tulane University School of Law made extensive editorial
suggestions. My colleagues, John Ely and Gerald Gunther, read and provided helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft of this article. My experiences as a law clerk for Justice Douglas in
1956-57 provided the inspiration for writing this article, as well as evidence for some of my
conclusions about his role in the Rosenberg case.
1 Parrish, Cold Warjustice: The Supreme Court and the Rosenbergs, 82 AM. HIST. REV. 805
(1977).
2 Id. at 842.
3 The defendants presented their application for a stay of execution on June 15, 1953,
the last day of the 1952 Term. The next day, a "next friend" petition was filed seeking
habeas corpus and a stay. On June 17, Justice Douglas denied the stay requested by defend-
ants on the ground that it raised no new issues, but granted the stay in the "next friend"
petition. Chief Justice Vinson called the Court into special session to hear argument on va-
cating the stay. The argument on the Attorney General's motion to vacate the stay took
place on June 18, and the decision vacating the stay was announced on June 19. The
Rosenbergs were executed later that day. For a complete chronology of the Rosenberg case, see
infra Appendix, The Chronology of the Rosenberg Case, p. 251. See also Rosenberg v. United
States, 346 U.S. 273, 281-85 (1953); Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 313 (1953) (Douglas
opinion granting stay of execution). These events are discussed infra text accompanying notes
173-204.
4 There are many examples of the Supreme Court's surrender to cold war hysteria. See,
e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (upholding federal statute providing for deportation
of aliens who were former members of the Communist Party); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342
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ior in the Rosenberg case had always appeared to be one of the most vivid
examples of his fortitude.5
Professor Parrish bases his case against Douglas on the five votes
Douglas cast against hearing the case at different stages of the proceed-
ing.6 He concludes that Douglas's behavior either "remains inexplicable
in view of his own later apparent interest in the case,"' 7 or supports Jus-
tice Jackson's conclusion that Douglas was grandstanding-not wanting
to review the case, but maintaining his liberal credentials through pub-
lic dissent. 8 Parrish's analysis of Justice Douglas's actions in the Rosen-
U.S. 485 (1952) (upholding state statute requiring dismissal of public school teachers associ-
ated with subversive organizations); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951)
(municipality may require employees to execute affidavits denying affiliation with the Com-
munist Party); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (conviction of Communist Party
leaders for advocating violent overthrow of government did not violate first amendment);
Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), a.f'dper curiam, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (up-
holding executive power to dismiss government employees suspected of disloyalty).
5 My own views of Douglas are identical to those of Justice Hans Linde, who clerked
for him five years before I did. "'Douglas and Black were the only Justices I would have
wanted to clerk for at that moment .... I felt privileged to be on the side of a man of
courage who was doing the right thing .... .' J. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY: THE
LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 298 (1980) (quoting Justice Linde). Douglas and Black dis-
sented in all of the cases cited at supra note 4.
6 Only one of Douglas's negative votes could not have been deduced from the public
record. Douglas's dissents from the denial of review in the Rosenberg cases were publicly noted.
It appears that when Douglas did not dissent, he voted to deny review. He failed to dissent
on three occasions: In Rosenberg v. United States, 344 U.S. 838 (1952), he joined the Court's
denial of certiorari to review the court of appeals affirmance of the Rosenbergs' conviction.
Justice Black noted his dissent. See infra text following note 47. In Rosenberg v. United
States, 344 U.S. 889 (1952), he joined the Court's denial of rehearing. Black noted his dissent
and Frankfurter filed a memorandum. See infra text following note 47. In Rosenberg v.
United States, 345 U.S. 1003 (1953), Douglas did not dissent from the Court's denial of an
original writ of habeas corpus. Black noted his dissent and Frankfurter filed a memorandum.
See infra text at note 153. One other negative note was publicly recorded, but was coupled
with a vote to hear another aspect of the case. In Rosenberg v. United States, 345 U.S. 989
(1953), Justice Douglas and four other Justices voted not to hear oral argument on an appli-
cation for a stay of execution. Douglas's opinion explained that the Court's refusal to grant
certiorari in another aspect of the case raising the same issues rendered oral argument on a
stay pointless. See infra text accompanying note 141.
One negative vote discussed by Parrish is revealed solely by Justice Frankfurter's and
Justice Burton's documents. That negative vote was withdrawn, and eventually became a
recorded dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari on May 25, 1953. Rosenberg v. United
States, 345 U.S. 965 (1953) (review of court of appeals affirmance of district court's refusal to
vacate sentence and conviction). When this proceeding in the case was first discussed in con-
ference on April 11, however, Douglas had voted to deny certiorari. Parrish, supra note 1, at
822 (citing F. Frankfurter, Rosenberg memorandum 4 (June 4, 1953) (available in Frank-
furter Papers, Harvard Law School Library, box 65, file 1)). Douglas announced his change
of mind in a memorandum to the conference on May 22. At the conference on May 23,
Justice Jackson changed his negative vote to provide the fourth vote to hear the case, but
ultimately voted to deny review after Douglas decided to dissent without publishing his mem-
orandum. Parrish, supra note 1, at 825. See infra text following note 105, and Appendix, supra
note 3, p. 251.
7 Parrish, supra note 1, at 826.
8 Id. Douglas's autobiography supports the claim that Douglas wanted to be
remembered as a dissenter in the Rosenberg case. In describing the events preceding his grant
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berg cases is reflected in a sympathetic Douglas biography by James F.
Simon, 9 who labels Douglas's votes against hearing arguments "enig-
matic" 10 and "inconsistent with [Douglas's] whole judicial approach
and philosophy."' I Simon concludes that
there was something profoundly unsettling about Douglas's behavior.
Douglas, the outspoken champion of the underdog, insisted on deal-
ing with the Rosenberg case on his terms alone, seemingly oblivious to
the desperate pleas of the Rosenberg attorneys and several of his col-
leagues. In doing so, Douglas forced the Rosenbergs into a [deadly]
game of Russian roulette. 12
Parrish and Simon raise two distinct questions. First, was it inconsistent
with Douglas's normal philosophy concerning Supreme Court review of
death penalty cases to have cast negative votes at certain stages of the
Rosenberg cases? Second, was it inconsistent for Douglas to have voted to
grant review at some stages of the Rosenberg cases while voting to deny
review at others? Answers to both questions require a detailed examina-
tion of the issues that were raised at different stages in the Rosenbergs'
attempts to obtain Supreme Court review of their convictions. It is also
important to examine the reports available in the Justices' private
records about the debates regarding the Rosenberg cases among the Jus-
tices. Both Parrish and Simon rely on the views of Justices Frankfurter
and Jackson for their conclusions about Justice Douglas's voting pat-
tern, despite the fact that both Justices were hostile witnesses to these
events. 13
In the end, these records show that Parrish and Simon are wrong
about Douglas. His philosophy and actions were consistent throughout
the Rosenberg saga. He believed that Supreme Court review should not
be granted unless the Rosenbergs raised substantial questions of law,
worthy of review on the merits. He was thus completely at odds with
of stay, Douglas said, "Their convictions were sustained by the Court of Appeals, and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari, Mr. Justice Black (344 U.S. 889) and 1 (345 U.S. 965-966)
voting to grant." W.O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM
0. DOUGLAS 79 (1980). It is true that only Black and Douglas recorded dissents from denial
of review on the merits at the various stages. But see supra note 6.
9 J. SIMON, supra note 5, at 298-313. The biography is sympathetic, but not idolatrous,
with considerable detail concerning Douglas's troubled relationships with his first three wives,
his children, his colleagues, and his law clerks. Moreover, it is a personal biography, with
only limited attention to the details of individual decisions. Nevertheless, 15 pages in this 456
page book are devoted to the Rosenberg case. Id.
See also R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, THE ROSENBERG FILE: A SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH
398-401, 565 (1983) (describing Parrish's article as "an authoritative account of the Supreme
Court's handling of the Rosenberg case and the personal views of the nine Justices, Frank-
furter in particular").
10 J. SIMON, supra note 5, at 299.
11 Id at 312. Simon argues that Douglas was a "result-oriented libertarian" who "rarely
based his judicial decisions on technical procedural grounds." Id.
12 Id at 313.
13 See infra note 120.
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Frankfurter, who saw review as an opportunity for the Court to affirm
the convictions and quiet the national controversy surrounding the
case. 14
Before plunging into the historical records, however, one caveat is
in order. In evaluating the Supreme Court's role in the Rosenbergs'
executions, two issues of continuing interest must remain secondary. 15
The Rosenbergs' guilt or innocence, resting squarely on the credibility
of the government's witnesses, was not an issue that could be resolved by
an appellate court. 16 Similarly, the wisdom of imposition of the death
penalty by Judge Kaufman, the trial judge, was not an issue open to a
federal appellate court under standards applied in the 1950s.17 Thus,
these questions are not central to Parrish's study of the Supreme Court's
several refusals to review the Rosenbergs' convictions.
I
SHOULD THE CASE HAVE BEEN REVIEWED BY THE
SUPREME COURT WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE
SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE ISSUES?
For the Supreme Court, there was not one Rosenberg case, but
many. 8 Justices Black and Frankfurter voted to review Rosenberg cases
at every opportunity; Douglas did not. 9 Each of the Rosenberg cases in-
volved different issues, however. Should the Supreme Court have
granted review whether or not the legal arguments made were impor-
tant or substantial?
14 See infra text accompanying note 23.
15 For differing evaluations of whether the Rosenbergs were innocent, compare W.
SCHNEIR & M. SCHNEIR, INVITATION TO AN INQUEST: REOPENING THE ROSENBERG
"ATOM SPY" CASE (1973), with R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, supra note 9.
16 See, e.g., Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645,652-53 (1945) (holding that when an eviden-
tiary basis for jury's finding exists, appellate court is not free to weigh conflicting evidence or
to judge credibility of witnesses); W. SCHNEIR & M. SCHNEIR, supra note 15, at 177.
17 In affirming the Rosenbergs' convictions, Judge Jerome Frank's opinion for the court
of appeals stated that "[u]nless we are to over-rule sixty years of undeviating federal prece-
dents, we must hold that an appellate court has no power to modify a sentence." United
States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 604 (2d Cir. 1952). Judge Frank did suggest in a footnote
that the Rosenbergs "may ask the Supreme Court. . . to over-rule the decisions precluding
federal appellate modification of a sentence not exceeding the maximum fixed by a valid
statute, and to direct us accordingly to consider whether or not these sentences are excessive."
Id. at 609 n.41. In a memorandum filed in connection with the denial to rehear the denial of
certiorari, Justice Frankfurter noted that five new questions had been raised beyond those in
the original petition for certiorari. "So far as these questions come within the power of this
Court to adjudicate, I do not, of course, imply any opinion upon them. One of the questions,
however, first raised in the petition for rehearing, is beyond the scope of the authority of this
Court, and I deem it appropriate to say so. A sentence imposed by a United States district
court, even though it be a death sentence, is not within the power of this Court to revise."
Rosenberg, 344 U.S. at 890. For further discussion of this issue, see infia notes 68-71 and accom-
panying text.
18 See supra note 6.
19 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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In his published dissent from the Court's decision vacating Doug-
las's stay of the Rosenbergs' executions, Justice Black indicated that he
had voted to grant certiorari to review affirmance of their convictions, in
part because the case presented "important questions. '20 Beyond that,
he argued:
I have long thought that the practice of some of the states to require
an automatic review by the highest court of the state in cases which
involve the death penalty was a good practice.
It is not amiss to point out that this Court has never reviewed this
record and has never affirmed the fairness of the trial below. Without
an affirmance of the fairness of the trial by the highest court of the
land there may always be questions as to whether these executions
were legally and rightfully carried out.2 '
Justice Frankfurter also believed that automatic Supreme Court review
was appropriate in those rare cases where a federal court imposed a
death sentence.2 2 He was also convinced that the public controversy
surrounding the Rosenberg case added to the Court's institutional respon-
sibility to hear the case.23
Douglas voted to deny the Rosenbergs' first certiorari petition. Ini-
tially he voted to deny the second petition as well.24 For Parrish, the
most "plausible, if still unflattering, explanation of [Douglas's] behavior
is that Douglas, unlike Black and Frankfurter, believed the case then
presented neither significant constitutional issues nor a threat to the
Court's moral authority."25 The question whether the issues raised were
20 Rosenberg, 346 U.S. at 300.
21 Id at 300-01.
22 See, e.g., Parrish, sufira note 1, at 817 (quoting Frankfurter, who summarized his argu-
ment at the conference on the Rosenbergs' first certiorari petition by contending that "the
rare cases in which federal courts imposed death sentences should generally. . . be reviewed
by us."). Justice Frankfurter agonized over cases involving the death penalty, often torn be-
tween his opposition to capital punishment and his general theories of judicial restraint in
constitutional adjudication. See generally Miller & Bowman, "Slow Dance on the Killing Ground":
The Willie Francis Case Revisited, 32 DE PAUL L. REv. 1 (1982) (describing events during the
Court's hearing of Louisiana ex re. Francis v. Reswebber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)). In Francis,
Justice Frankfurter persuaded Justice Burton to provide the fourth vote to grant certiorari,
and ultimately voted to let execution proceed, but worked behind the scenes to secure execu-
tive clemency.
23 Frankfurter's memorandum to the conference on the Rosenbergs' second certiorari
petition referred to the doubts about the case that had been expressed by responsible people.
The death sentences should not be carried out, he said, without putting behind the sentences
"'the moral authority that would come from a finding by this Court, after an examination of
the record and hearing argument, that there was no flaw in the trial that calls for reversal.' "
Parrish, supra note 1, at 823 (quoting from F. Frankfurter, Memorandum for the Conference
(May 20, 1953) (available in Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School Library, box 65, file
7)).
24 See supra note 6.
25 Parrish, supra note 1, at 819. Parrish first raises, then dismisses the possibility that
Douglas had lingering political ambition, and might have had hopes for the 1952 Democratic
nomination. "If Douglas's ambitions for political office remained alive, a confrontation in the
1985]
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substantial will be discussed below. Assuming that Douglas would vote
to deny review if he concluded that the Rosenbergs' legal arguments
were insubstantial, would it be "unflattering" to find that Douglas did
not believe that a federal death sentence and loud public debate alone
required Supreme Court review of the case?
The death sentence argument must be assessed from the vantage
point of the 1950s rather than the 1970s. The constitutionality of the
death penalty was not seriously doubted in 1952 and 1953.26 If federal
death sentences were rare, death sentences imposed and carried out in
the states were not.2 7 Douglas's ultimate position concerning the valid-
ity of the death penalty had not yet matured. The situation today,
when hundreds of death sentences have been delayed for years by con-
tinuing litigation, had no parallel in the 1950s.2 8 Thus, Douglas's disa-
greement with Frankfurter and Black over the death sentence argument
does not demonstrate any surprising insensitivity to the death penalty
issue on Douglas's part.
The argument that Supreme Court review would silence popular
debate about the Rosenberg case overlooks the fact that two of the most
important issues in that debate could not be settled by the Supreme
Court. Whether the Rosenbergs were guilty and whether the death pen-
alty was the appropriate punishment were never among the issues that
were open for appellate review.29 It is thus doubtful that the Court's
affirmance of the convictions, after full consideration of legally insignifi-
cant arguments, would have given the death sentences "the moral au-
thority that would come from a finding by [the] Court . . . that there
was no flaw in the trial."30 In any case, Douglas was not moved by the
argument that the case should be reviewed because of the popular de-
bate concerning the fairness of the Rosenbergs' trial. His ultimate deci-
sion to grant a last-minute stay in the case demonstrates that public
Court over domestic espionage amid the fetid atmosphere of 1952 would have presented a
dilemma best avoided by refusing to hear the Rosenberg case." Id He concludes that this
explanation is implausible because Douglas made no effort to secure the 1952 nomination,
did not possess a "coherent political organization," and voted to deny the Rosenbergs' peti-
tion for rehearing three days after Eisenhower's 1952 landslide victory. Id See alsoJ. SIMON,
supra note 5, at 313 (dismissing possibility that Douglas's votes were motivated by political
ambitions).
26 See Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L.
REV. 1773, 1777-1806 (1970) (discussing development of the Court's treatment of cruel and
unusual punishment). See generally H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 231-58.
(1967) (describing change of public attitude toward death penalty from the 1950s).
27 See, e.g., H. BEDAU, supra note 26, at 113-15 (reprinting table from U.S. Bureau of
Prisons, National Prisoner Statistics 32 (Apr. 1963) (illustrating that from 1950-54, 413 execu-
tions took place, and only six of those were ordered by federal courts)).
28 See Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 26, at 1791 (noting decline in executions is
affected by "current stays of execution and postconviction proceedings").
29 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
30 See supra note 23.
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opinion did not affect his votes. In Douglas's view, the mounting na-
tional and international campaign on behalf of the Rosenbergs31 did not
provide a legitimate reason for Supreme Court action.
If there was nothing disreputable about Douglas's views concerning
the death penalty or his disregard for public opinion, then Parrish's cri-
tique must rest on the assumption that Douglas's votes to deny review
were inconsistent with his treatment of other cases. Parrish concludes
that Douglas, "a paladin among American liberals, was the true anom-
aly,"32 because of his votes to deny review. Simon refers to the five votes
to deny review cast by "the outspoken champion of the underdog" as
"profoundly unsettling. '33 This implied charge of inconsistency calls for
some explanation beyond the colorless conclusion that in Douglas's view
the Rosenbergs' arguments were insubstantial. Neither Parrish nor Si-
mon explicitly says so, but both clearly assume that Douglas normally
would have voted to grant a hearing at all stages in a controversial
death penalty case, whatever the merit of the legal arguments raised.
The public record of Douglas's actions in another death penalty
case, Chessman v. Teets,34 belies this assumption. Throughout the Chess-
man case, he maintained the consistent position that there was no point
in reviewing even a case in which a life was at stake unless the case
presented some legal issue that could arguably provide a basis for action
by the Court. The Court concluded that Chessman had not been given
an adequate hearing concerning the accuracy of his trial transcript, re-
constructed after the death of the court reporter.35 Douglas dissented
from the Court's reversal on these grounds of decisions denying federal
habeas corpus relief.36 He stated in his dissent that he agreed "with the
31 See generaly W. SCHNEIR & M. SCHNEIR, supra note 15, at 175-95 (describing both
national and international campaigns seeking to assist Rosenbergs).
32 Parrish, supra note 1, at 819.
33 J. SIMON, supra note 5, at 313.
34 354 U.S. 156 (1957). Caryl Chessman's remarkable struggle to avoid execution in
California's gas chamber generated international interest and protest. Execution Stirs Anti-US
Rallies, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1960, at 23, col. 2. In 1948, Chessman was convicted on 17 counts
of kidnapping, robbery, and attempted rape and was sentenced to die although his crimes did
not involve homicide. He conducted his own trial defense, studied law while living on death
row, and did legal work on his own appeals. He also wrote four published books, using the
proceeds to obtain the assistance of outside counsel on his appeals. Eight times during his
nearly 12 year stay on death row, he successfully stayed execution dates. His execution was
carried out on the ninth scheduled date, May 2, 1960. Cal Chessman Executed- Denies his Guilt
to the End, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1960, at 1, col. 2; Twelve Year Court Fight HeedStir Pleas to Save
Chessman, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1960, at 22, col. 3.
35 Chessman, 354 U.S. at 161-66. The problem was that, in the trial court's hearing to
settle the transcript, Chessman, who had consistently refused representation by an attorney,
was not permitted to appear in person. The Court concluded that, despite Chessman's consis-
tent refusal to be represented by an attorney at his trial, he should have been offered the
opportunity to be represented by counsel at the hearing. Id. at 162-63.
36 Id at 166. The long post-conviction history of the case, which began with a trial
ending in May, 1948, is detailed in an appendix to Douglas's dissent.
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general principle announced" but concluded that its application had
produced "a needless detour in a case already long-drawn-out by many
appeals. ' 37 Douglas argued that Chessman never pointed to any omit-
ted or inaccurate portion of the transcript that could have affected his
appeal to the California Supreme Court. "To order, after this long de-
lay, a new record seems to me a futility."3 8
Douglas's announced philosophy of review in Chessman coincides
completely with his approach in Rosenberg.39 He believed that "in a case
like this it matters not whether the petitioner is guilty or innocent,
whether his complaint is timely or tardy. We should respect a man's
constitutional right whenever or however it is presented to us."40 Even
in a case involving the death penalty, Douglas was convinced that the
important question was whether "in substance, the requirements of due
process have been fully satisfied" because "to require more is to exalt a
technicality. '41
37 Id. at 166.
38 Id. at 173.
39 My first-hand experience as Douglas's clerk supports the public record of Douglas's
philosophy concerning stays in death penalty cases. I worked on the Chessman case and on a
less controversial death penalty case, People v. Abbott, 47 Cal. 2d 362, 303 P.2d 730 (1956).
Following the affirmance of Burton Abbott's death sentence by the California Supreme
Court, Abbott's counsel sought a stay from Douglas as Circuit Justice pending the filing of a
petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court. On an application for a stay, the question of
course was different from that raised on a vote to grant or deny review. A Justice might grant
a stay if there were a reasonable possibility that four other Justices would find the issue sub-
stantial, whatever his own views. My memorandum to Douglas argued that no one should be
put to death without a chance to petition for review in the Supreme Court. The Justice told
me that he did "not work that way." He would deny a stay unless there was some issue in the
case that, arguably, could provide the basis for review in the Supreme Court. When I re-
ported that the petition for stay simply had a conclusory allegation that Abbott had been
denied due process of law, I was informed that this was not sufficient. My own day-long
study of the opinion of the California Supreme Court, and the record, could not unearth even
a colorable federal claim. Douglas denied the stay in an unreported decision.
Ironically, Judge Denman, the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit, subsequently granted
Abbott a stay. His reasoning was identical to that I had pressed on Douglas: that Abbott
should not be executed until his time to petition the Supreme Court for review had expired.
Douglas commented to me that he and Judge Denman applied different standards. Abbott
was executed on March 15, 1957, although Governor Goodwin Knight had issued a tempo-
rary stay of execution that was not communicated to the prison in time.
40 Chessman, 354 U.S. at 166.
41 Id. at 167. Douglas's approach in Chessman is fully consistent with his position on June
15, 1953, that oral argument on a stay of execution for the Rosenbergs was pointless because
the Court had already decided not to review the Rosenbergs' case. See supra note 6. Douglas's
prediction that Chessman's objections would inevitably be overruled proved to be true:
Chessman did succeed in obtaining a writ of mandamus, requiring the Los Angeles Superior
Court to change its procedures before hearing the motion to resettle the reporter's transcript.
Chessman v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 835, 330 P.2d 225 (1958). In the following year, the
California Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision to deny Chessman a new
trial. People v. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467, 341 P.2d 679 (1959). The day after Governor
Edmund G. Brown, Sr., denied a petition for clemency, the United States Supreme Court
stayed the execution pending filing of a timely certiorari petition. Chessman v. California,
361 U.S. 871 (1959). Two months later, the petition was denied. Chessman v. California, 361
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It is easy to see how Parrish could have mistakenly assumed that
Douglas normally would have voted to grant review in a case such as the
Rosenbergs' in order to delay their executions or provide one last full
hearing, whatever the outcome. 42 In granting the stay of execution,
Douglas did say that it was "important that before we allow human
lives to be snuffed out we be sure-emphatically sure-that we act
within the law. If we are not sure, there will be lingering doubts to
plague the conscience after the event."143 This was not, however, a state-
ment that the Supreme Court should automatically review the
Rosenbergs' death sentences, regardless of the nature of the issues raised
on their behalf. The statement must be read in the context of an opin-
ion arguing that there were substantial issues justifying review. Douglas
believed that argument and deliberation were necessary if substantial
questions were raised, no matter how heinous the Rosenbergs' crime or
how loud the clamor for their speedy execution. That was his view in
the Rosenberg cases and in all other capital cases.
Douglas has often been criticized as result-oriented and indifferent
to legal issues. It is ironic that this caricature of Douglas led Parrish to
criticize him for acting on his reasonable responses to the various legal
issues raised at the different stages of the Rosenberg case. As will be seen,
Douglas's votes to grant or deny review in the Rosenberg cases rested on
the issues that had been raised. He consistently voted against plenary
Supreme Court review, even in capital cases, when review would be
pointless. 44 If there were no substantial legal arguments, he would not
vote for review merely to delay imposition of capital punishment. He
did not agree with the Black-Frankfurter position that all death
sentences imposed by a federal court should be reviewed by the
Supreme Court. He was not moved by Frankfurter's arguments that the
Supreme Court should review the cases in order to affirm the convic-
tions and silence the controversy surrounding the cases.45 Whether or
not one agrees with Douglas's position, the conclusion that this simple
explanation of Douglas's votes is either "enigmatic" 46 or "unflatter-
U.S. 925 (1959). The Supreme Court denied rehearing in January 1960, Chessman v. Cali-
fornia, 361 U.S. 941 (1960), and a month later the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
denied a writ of habeas corpus. Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 955 (1960). Two last minute applications for stay of execution presented to
Justice Douglas were referred to the Court and denied. Chessman v. Dickson, 362 U.S. 966
(1960); Chessman v. Teets, 362 U.S. 965 (1960).
42 Such expectations concerning Douglas are common enough. When the opinions in
Chessman v. Teets were delivered to the Supreme Court Clerk's office, a deputy clerk told me
that, when he saw the names on the opinions (Harlan for the majority and Douglas in dis-
sent), he naturally assumed that the decisions below, against Chessman, had been affirmed.
43 Rosenberg, 346 U.S. at 321.
44 See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
45 See supra notes 14, 23 and accompanying text.
46 See supra note 10.
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ing"47 lacks support.
The questions of whether Douglas was insensitive to substantial
questions and whether he was inconsistent in voting to deny review at
some stages of the case and then dissenting from denial of review and
granting the stay of execution at another remains. These inquiries re-
quire an analysis of the different issues raised at those various stages.
II
DID THE ROSENBERGS' COUNSEL RAISE SUBSTANTIAL
ISSUES IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO SECURE
SUPREME COURT REVIEW?
A. Appeal of the Initial Conviction
Douglas voted to deny petitions for certiorari and rehearing on the
Rosenbergs' petition for Supreme Court review of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals decision affirming their convictions. 48 Among the
votes he cast to deny argument in the Rosenberg case, these are the most
significant. There were three Justices who voted to review the decision
on both occasions, 49 and under the Court's rule of four, Douglas's nega-
tive votes were crucial. Those votes, however, rested on a proper conclu-
sion that none of the issues raised by the Rosenbergs provided a
substantial argument either for reversing the convictions or changing
the sentences.
In their petition for certiorari to review the affirmance of their con-
victions, and in the petition for rehearing following the denial of certio-
rari, the Rosenbergs raised several issues, all of which had been
unanimously rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit.50 Judge Jerome Frank's opinion for the court of appeals,
however, suggested that some of the Rosenbergs' arguments might merit
Supreme Court review.5' Justices Black and Burton considered some of
47 See supra note 25.
48 United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952).
49 Justice Black noted his dissent to the denial of the petitions both times. 344 U.S. at
838; 344 U.S. at 889. The papers of Justice Frankfurter and Justice Burton indicate that they
also voted to grant review. Parrish, supra note 1, at 816-17 (citing F. Frankfurter, supra note 6;
and Burton, Conference Sheets, Certs, and Appeals for 1952 Term (available in Harold Bur-
ton Papers, Library of Congress, box 248)). Justice Frankfurter had foreclosed the possibility
of publicly disclosing his dissent from the denial of certiorari by having consistently taken the
position that it was inappropriate to note individual votes when a petition for certiorari was
denied. See, e.g., Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Group of Inst'l Investors, 343 U.S. 982, 982
(1952) (Memorandum of Frankfurter, J.) (due regard for administration of certiorari jurisdic-
tion precludes noting dissents). His published memorandum on the denial of rehearing pur-
ports neither to take a position nor to disclose his vote, but it suggests that he voted to grant
review. A Frankfurter memorandum in a case, explaining that he could not disclose whether
his vote had been to grant or deny review, was often a signal that he had voted to grant
review.
50 United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952).
51 Writing only for himself, Frank suggested that although federal decisions consistently
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these issues worthy of review.52 We have no record of Douglas's reasons
for voting to deny certiorari. 53 It is thus necessary to examine the issues
that the Rosenbergs raised in order to determine whether any of them,
particularly those identified as significant by Justice Black, Justice Bur-
ton, and Judge Frank, were sufficiently substantial that Douglas's votes
to deny review can be criticized, in his own terms, for allowing "human
lives to be snuffed out" when he was not "sure-emphatically sure-
that we act within the law."'54
The Rosenbergs' most important arguments55 on the appeal of
their convictions centered on the provisions of article III, section 3, of
the Constitution that define the crime of treason as "adhering to" the
"enemies" of the United States, and that require the testimony of two
denied appellate judges the power to revise sentences: "[T]he Supreme Court alone is in a
position to hold that [28 U.S.C.] Sec. 2106 confers authority to reduce a sentence which is not
outside the bounds set by a valid statute." 195 F.2d at 606-07 (footnote omitted). Writing for
the Second Circuit, Frank rejected the argument that a death sentence for an offense which is
similar to, but less grave than treason, was cruel and unusual punishment. Id at 611. Frank
reasoned that, because "the Quirn case had the unavoidable consequence of permitting death
sentences to be imposed upon the citizen-saboteurs for crimes other than treason, the
Supreme Court must there have implicitly rejected the 'cruel and unusual' argument." Id.
(citing ErparleQuirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)). Frank added, however, that because the Supreme
Court did not specifically discuss this issue, "that Court may well think it desirable to review
that aspect of our decision." 195 F.2d at 611. On a third point, Frank disagreed with the
other Second Circuit judges. The court of appeals rejected an argument that the statutory
requirement that the prosecution supply a list of witnesses to the defense was applicable to a
witness called in rebuttal. Frank, however, expressed "some doubt as to whether" the wit-
ness's testimony was rebuttal. Id. at 599 n. 14. Nevertheless, Frank joined Judges Swan and
Chase in concluding that, at most, the defendants were entitled to an adjournment. "It might
well have been error to refuse a reasonable request for adjournment coupled with some show-
ing of surprise. But defendants made no such request." Id at 600 (footnote omitted). Parrish
seems to include this as an issue where Frank had "virtually begged the Court to resolve his
own doubts." Parrish, supra note 1, at 815.
52 Parrish, supra note 1, at 816-17 (citing F. Frankfurter, supra note 6, and Burton, supra
note 49). Black believed that the case should be reviewed because it involved a federal death
sentence. See supra text accompanying note 21. Burton identified two issues meriting review
in the Rosenbergs' case, but he also indicated in his notes that he doubted the arguments
would succeed on the merits. Parrish, supra note 1, at 816, 818. His vote to review the case
was based on the strong feelings of two Justices. Id at 818. It was not unusual for Burton to
change his position on a case at the urgings of other Justices, despite his own doubts that .the
issues had merit. See In Memodiam--Harold Hiz Burton, 78 HARv. L. REV. 799, 800 (1965)
(quoting Letter from Justice Frankfurter to Harvard Law Review). Justice Frankfurter did not
discuss whether some issues were substantial enough to merit review. Parrish, supra note 1, at
816-17. Justice Frankfurter contended that the Court had an "institutional responsibility to
hear the case" in order "to calm popular alarm over the legality of the convictions," without
reference to the substantiality of any issue. Id at 818; see also supra note 22 and accompanying
text.
53 Justice Frankfurter noted that Douglas gave no reasons or arguments for his votes,
stating that this was Douglas's normal behavior on certiorari votes. Parrish, supra note 1, at
817 (citing F. Frankfurter, supra note 6).
54 Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. at 321; see also supra text at note 43.
55 These arguments are important in the sense that they were singled out by two Justices
and Judge Frank. See infra text accompanying notes 59-61.
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witnesses to the same overt act for conviction. The Soviet Union was
not an "enemy" at the time the Rosenbergs were alleged to have passed
atomic secrets, making the crime of which the Rosenbergs were con-
victed espionage, rather than treason. The Rosenbergs argued on ap-
peal that the constitutional safeguards applicable to the "greater" crime
of treason should apply to the "lesser" offense of espionage. Thus, the
Court should vacate their convictions because only one witness testified
to any overt act on which their convictions rested.5 6 A second argu-
ment, that the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment, was
also tied to the treason clause.57 According to this argument, courts tra-
ditionally were authorized to impose the death penalty for treason, but
imposition of the death penalty for the lesser offense of espionage was so
disproportionate that it violated the eighth amendment.
The court of appeals addressed and rejected both contentions. The
court found the "lesser offense" argument to be squarely foreclosed by
the 1942 Supreme Court decision in Ex pare Quirin.58 Judge Frank's
opinion, however, stated that the death penalty argument had never
been specifically discussed by the Supreme Court, which "may well
think it desirable to review that aspect of our decision .-59 Parrish relies
on Judge Frank's remark in arguing that these issues were substantial.
He quotes Frankfurter's notes reporting that Black thought both treason
clause issues serious, 6° and Burton's notes indicating that he felt the
same way.6 1
Douglas's vote to deny review must have rested on his conclusion,
shared by at least five other Justices, that both treason clause issues were
insubstantial. Unless the Court was prepared to overrule Ex parte Qui-
rin,62 that conclusion was correct. In Quiin, the Court had sustained
death sentences against American citizens for violations of an article of
war which made it a crime for enemy belligerents to be within the
United States while out of uniform. The Court had rejected the argu-
ment that the procedural requirements of a treason trial must be satis-
fied, reasoning that this treason-like offense was distinct from article III
treason. Applying this logic to the Rosenberg case, Judge Frank stated:
56 United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 610 (2d Cir. 1952).
57 Id. at 611.
58 Id (citing Ex parle Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)); see supra note 52.
59 Rosenberg, 195 F.2d at 611.
60 Frankfurter states that Black "thought the fact that a death sentence had been im-
posed in time of peace for what was in effect a charge of treason. . . without observance of
the constitutional requirement .. .presented a serious question." Parrish, supra note 1, at
816 (quoting Frankfurter, supra note 6).
61 Parrish, supra note 1, at 816 (citing Burton, supra note 49). There is some confusion as
to which of the issues concerning the death penalty were thought substantial by Justice Bur-
ton. Nevertheless, Justice Burton doubted that any of the issues would warrant reversal. See
supra note 52.
62 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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In the Quirin case, the absence of uniform was an additional element,
essential to Haupt's non-treason offense although irrelevant to his
treason; in the Rosenbergs' case, an essential element of treason, giv-
ing aid to an "enemy," is irrelevant to the espionage offense.
63
The decision in Qurin that the procedural requirements of the treason
clause did not apply to a defendant who committed violations beyond
mere treason squarely refuted the Rosenbergs' argument that those pro-
cedural requirements were required in prosecutions for offenses less than
treason.
As Judge Frank noted, Quinn did not necessarily resolve the
Rosenbergs' eighth amendment argument although this second argu-
ment was "a variant of the first."'6 4 It was possible to argue that Quiin
left open the question of whether those guilty of an offense less than
treason could suffer a punishment as harsh as that provided for the
greater crime of treason.6 5 But that argument "would compel the
strange conclusion" that the congressional punishment for treason put a
ceiling on the punishments that could be imposed for all crimes less than
treason, or perhaps for all other crimes.6 6 Thus, although Judge Frank
labeled the argument as one that might not be completely foreclosed by
precedent, he concluded nonetheless that it had no merit.
Judge Frank identified a third issue that might provide the basis for
Supreme Court review, derived from the Rosenbergs' argument that the
death sentence was inappropriate because it had never before been im-
posed in an espionage case.6 7 Writing for the court, Judge Frank con-
cluded that federal courts lacked the power to review or modify any
sentence that was within the limits allowed by a valid statute, noting
that "for six decades federal decisions, including [those] of the Supreme
Court . . . have denied the existence of such authority .... "68 At the
same time, Judge Frank searched for some outlet for his own strong feel-
ings that the death penalty for the Rosenbergs was wrong. In two
63 195 F.2d at 611. Frank noted that the Quirin holding had been criticized in Hurst,
Treason in the United States, 58 HARV. L. REv. 395, 421 (1945), on the ground that it allowed
Congress to punish treason without the constitutional safeguards, by adding additional ele-
ments to a crime that would otherwise be treason. While the Quinin reasoning also fits a case
like Rosenberg, where the charged espionage crime differs from treason in not including one of
its elements-that the foreign country aided be an "enemy"--Hurst's criticism does not apply
to the Rosenbergs because the offense charged is not treason. The Rosenbergs' suggested
distinction of Quin, that the case "involved an appeal from a military tribunal of a convic-
tion for an offense against the laws of war," was rejected by the court of appeals. 195 F.2d at
611 n.3 (citing Hurst, supra, at 442 n.135).
64 195 F.2d at 611.
65 Quiin, as noted, involved a death sentence for "treason plus" while Rosenberg involved
a death sentence for "treason minus." See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
66 195 F.2d at 611. Parrish concedes that "Frank did not find much merit in [the] argu-
ments" surrounding the treason clause. Parrish, supra note 1, at 816 n.34.
67 195 F.2d at 604.
68 Id at 605-06 (citation omitted).
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paragraphs expressing "the views only of the writer of this opinion, 69
he pointed out that some commentators had urged that appellate courts
should have sentencing review powers, possessed by appellate courts in
England, Canada, and some states.70 He acknowledged, however, that
"the Supreme Court alone is in a position" to decide that federal appel-
late judges had such power. 7 1
Judge Frank's proposal has not been seriously considered by the
Supreme Court in the more than thirty years that have passed since the
Rosenberg cases.72 Even Justice Frankfurter, who carefully avoided con-
fronting the possible merits of any other issue in the case, 73 wrote in his
memorandum concerning the denial of rehearing that a sentence im-
posed by a trial court "even though it be a death sentence, is not within
the power of this court to revise."'74
Jerome Frank often incorporated scholarly essays in his judicial
opinions, some of them urging major reforms in the law.75 He only par-
tially resisted that temptation in his opinion in the Rosenberg case, where
he referred in the text to the views of scholars and the law of other juris-
dictions. Judge Frank tentatively explored his own views concerning
appellate power to revise criminal sentences in three lengthy footnotes. 76
His invitation to the Supreme Court to consider involving federal appel-
late judges in the sentencing process was more an outlet for his strong
feelings concerning the death penalty for the Rosenbergs than it was a
serious effort to make the Rosenberg case the vehicle for that major revi-
sion in settled law. 77
A fourth argument, included among those presented in the original
69 Id. at 605.
70 Id. Judge Frank cited Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal (pts 1 & 2), 37
COLUM. L. REv. 521, 762 (1937).
71 195 F.2d at 606.
72 In administering its eighth amendment standards in capital cases, the Supreme Court
has made much of the existence of appellate review of death sentences. See, e.g., Zant v.
Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2749-50 (1983) (mandatory appellate review an important proce-
dural safeguard, avoiding arbitrariness and assuring proportionality). Review of mandatory
life sentences has likewise been introduced. See Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983). The
use of cruel and unusual punishment standards to review death sentences, however, was not
to take place until 1972, decades after the Rosenberg case. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972). Judge Frank suggested Supreme Court review in Rosenberg through a possible inter-
pretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1982), which gives appellate courts general power to "affirm,
modify . . . or reverse" judgments on appeal. However, if that provision had provided the
basis for appellate modifications ofcriminal sentences, it would have extended to all criminal
sentences and not just death sentences. For modern arguments on this subject by another
federal judge, see M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES (1972).
73 See supra notes 49, 52.
74 344 U.S. at 890; see also supra note 17.
75 See W.O. Douglas, Jerome N. Frank, 10 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 4-6 (1957).
76 195 F.2d at 607-08 nn.29-31.
77 The Rosenbergs did not make the argument in their original petition for certiorari,
raising it for the first time in the petition for rehearing. 344 U.S. at 890.
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petition for certiorari and petition for rehearing, is also identified by
Parrish as "substantial" because of views expressed by Judge Frank. As
part of its case-in-chief, the government introduced evidence that Julius
Rosenberg had warned David Greenglass to leave the country, and had
told him that the Rosenbergs planned to flee to Mexico. 78 In the de-
fense case, the Rosenbergs' testimony on direct examination contra-
dicted the government's evidence. Furthermore, on cross-examination,
Julius Rosenberg denied having had passport pictures taken in May or
June of 1950. The government subsequently called Schneider, a profes-
sional photographer, as a rebuttal witness. Schneider testified that he
had taken photographs of the Rosenbergs and their children in May or
June of 1950, and that Julius Rosenberg had told him the pictures were
needed for travel abroad.7 9 The defense objected that it had not been
given Schneider's name on the list of government witnesses furnished
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3432.80 Parrish noted that "[n]ot only did the
name of the photographer. . . not appear on the list of witnesses for the
prosecution, but the government called him to testify after the
Rosenbergs rested their case." 8' Judge Kaufman, however, overruled
the objection on the ground that Schneider was a rebuttal witness whose
name was not required to be furnished by the statute.
None of the court of appeals judges questioned the settled rule that
the statute did not apply to government rebuttal witnesses. 2 The
Rosenbergs argued, however, that Schneider was not a "proper" rebut-
tal witness; he should have been called in the prosecution's case-in-chief,
and thus should have been on the list of witnesses. Two of the three
Second Circuit judges concluded that Schneider's testimony was proper
to rebut Julius Rosenberg's denial, during his cross-examination, of hav-
ing passport pictures made.83 In a footnote, Judge Frank expressed
doubt whether Schneider's testimony was proper rebuttal.84 He never-
theless agreed with his colleagues that, at most, the Rosenbergs would
78 David Greenglass was Ethel Rosenberg's brother and a former employee at the Los
Alamos, New Mexico, research site for the Manhattan Project. Greenglass was indicted along
with the Rosenbergs; he and his wife Ruth agreed to be the prosecution's chief witnesses at
trial in return for his reduced sentence. 195 F.2d at 592.
79 Id. at 599.
80 Id The statute requires that in cases of "treason or other capital offense" the defense
must be furnished with "a list. . . of the witnesses to be produced on the trial for proving the
indictment" three days before trial begins. 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1982).
81 Parrish, supra note 1, at 813 (emphasis in original).
82 195 F.2d at 599.
83 Id R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, supra note 9, at 265, suggest that the prosecution may
not have discovered Schneider prior to trial. They surmise that the FBI might not have
checked out the possibility that the Rosenbergs went to a private photographer, because there
was photographic equipment in their apartment.
84 195 F.2d at 599 n.14. Parrish apparently considers the issue to be substantial for that
reason alone. He seems to include this as an issue where Frank had "virtually begged the
Court to resolve his own doubts." Parrish, supra note 1, at 815.
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have been entitled to an adjournment on a showing of surprise8 5 The
Rosenbergs' counsel did not request adjournment at trial and did not
attempt to show surprise. Therefore, Judge Frank ruled that no error
was committed. 86 It is thus difficult to see why the Supreme Court
should have considered whether Schneider was a proper rebuttal
witness.
Parrish identifies two remaining issues raised at this stage as "sub-
stantial. '8 7 The first issue involved a jury request, during deliberation,
that the court read a portion of Ruth Greenglass's8 8 direct testimony.
The trial judge refused a defense request that her cross-examination be
read as well, on the ground that the jury had not requested it. The
defense had argued that Ruth Greenglass's testimony on direct and
cross-examination had been nearly identical, word for word, suggesting
that she had been coached. Because the defense counsel had made that
very argument on summation to the jury, however, the trial judge was
unmoved by the defense plea. The defense request was repeated in the
presence of the jury, and the judge made it clear that he would read
only what the jury requested. When the jury failed to ask to'hear the
cross-examination testimony, it became apparent that the jury did not
wish to hear it. The court of appeals concluded that the trial judge's
refusal to have the cross examination read to the jury was properly
within his discretion. 89 Parrish's account does not indicate that Judge
Frank, or any of the Justices who voted to grant certiorari, regarded this
issue as substantial.
The final issue suggested by Parrish appears more substantial now
that it was at the time, in light of disclosures made years later concern-
ing both Judge Kaufman's ex parte discussions with the prosecution
prior to imposing sentence, and his efforts after the trial to insure that
the death sentences would be carried out without delay.90 On appeal of
their convictions, the Rosenbergs argued that Judge Kaufman had not
been neutral, exhibiting hostility toward the defense. Whatever Judge
Kaufman's role in the Rosenberg case was off the bench, the trial tran-
script did not portray a hanging judge, and the court of appeals con-
cluded that Judge Kaufman had acted within the traditional latitude
afforded federal judges to "bring out the facts of the case."9' This con-
85 195 F.2d at 600.
86 Id
87 Parrish, supra note 1, at 813. In his analysis, Parrish considers these two issues
together.
88 See supra note 78.
89 195 F.2d at 599.
90 R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, supra note 9, at 428-29; Parrish, supra note 1, at 811 n.21.
See also Countryman, Out, Damned Spot: Judge Kaufman and the Rosenberg Case, THE NEW RE-
PUBLIC, Oct. 8, 1977, at 15-17.
91 195 F.2d at 594.
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clusion was, no doubt, strongly influenced by statements that the
Rosenbergs' counsel made during summation to the jury, that "we feel
that the trial has been conducted. . . with that dignity and that deco-
rum that befits an American trial" and that "the court conducted itself
as an American judge. ' 92 None of the participants appears to have re-
garded the complaint about Judge Kaufman's bias as a particularly
strong argument for reversal. The remaining points raised by the
Rosenbergs in their petition for certiorari and petition for rehearing
were even weaker.93
B. The First Motion for Post-Conviction Relief
The second Rosenberg case before the Supreme Court produced an
entirely new set of issues. Following their failure to win rehearing of the
denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, the Rosenbergs quickly insti-
tuted new proceedings in the District Court for the Southern District of
New York to vacate their convictions and sentences.94 Judge Kaufman
disqualified himself, and Judge Ryan rejected all of the new conten-
tions.95 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit96
92 Id at 593. The court of appeals also noted that, on making their motion for new trial
on the basis of Judge Kaufman's behavior, defense counsel stated that the judge's fault had
been "inadvertent" and that he had "been extremely courteous to us and afforded us...
every privilege that a lawyer should expect in a criminal case." Id Judge Frank's opinion,
expressed in private correspondence, was that "the defendants received a fair trial. Indeed it
was more fair than many in which convictions have been affirmed." Parrish, supra note 1, at
816 n.34 (citing letter from Judge Frank to Zachariah Chafee (Nov. 18, 1952)).
93 These points are not included on Parrish's list ofsubstantial issues. Parrish, supra note
1, at 812-14. The Rosenbergs claimed that the Espionage Act was unconstitutionally vague,
an argument rejected in Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941). With the vagueness
contention resolved by Gorin, the related first amendment argument collapsed as well, because
the free speech guarantee did not invalidate a statute that explicitly forbids the communica-
tion of state secrets related to national defense to a foreign government. The Rosenbergs also
argued that the indictment was vague because it did not allege that the information allegedly
passed to the Soviet Union was "not public," because United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813
(2d Cir. 1945), had interpreted the statute as inapplicable to information the government had
consented to make public. This argument was frivolous, since rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure permitted recitation of the criminal statute, and that recitation "neces-
sarily imported its correct judicial interpretation." 195 F.2d at 591.
A number of arguments involved evidence alleged to have been improperly admitted.
The evidence of the Rosenbergs' Communist Party membership, while obviously prejudicial,
was just as obviously probative of their probable motives. 195 F.2d at 595-96. Other evi-
dence attacked as hearsay had been admitted without objection, was not prejudicial, and fell
within an exception to the hearsay rule regarding statements of a co-conspirator. Id. at 596-
97. Finally, the Rosenbergs argued in the petition for rehearing that Judge Kaufman had
relied on extra-record facts in deciding to impose the death penalty, a practice specifically
permitted by Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1946).
94 These proceedings were brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982) which provides
for habeas corpus relief for federal prisoners. The Rosenbergs' second attempt to obtain
§ 2255 relief is recounted at infra Part II.C.
95 United States v. Rosenberg, 108 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
96 United States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1952). The court of appeals deci-
sion was announced on December 31, 1952. On January 2, 1953, Judge Kaufman denied a
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affirmed Judge Ryan's decision in another unanimous decision. Eventu-
ally, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to review the
court of appeals decision, and Justice Douglas publicly recorded his dis-
sent.97 Parrish's study of the papers of Justice Burton and Justice
Frankfurter shows, however, that Justice Douglas had initially voted to
deny certiorari in this case, as well, but had changed his mind. 98 Parrish
is persuaded that Douglas's action was "inexplicable" at best,99 and per-
haps even "grandstanding" at worst. 00 Can Douglas's inconsistent
votes be explained more simply?
The Rosenbergs' post-conviction motion presented four issues. The
most substantial issue, and the center of attention in both the court of
appeals and the Supreme Court, concerned the conduct of the prosecu-
tor.'0 t During the trial, prosecutor Irving Saypol had indicted William
motion for reduction of sentence. 109 F. Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). On February 17, 1953,
the court of appeals stayed execution pending Supreme Court review. Parrish, supra note 1, at
822; see also Appendix, supra note 3, p. 251.
97 United States v. Rosenberg, 345 U.S. 965 (1953).
98 Parrish, supra note 1, at 822-26.
99 Id. at 826.
100 Id.
101 The other three contentions were that there had been prejudicial publicity before and
during the trial, that the prosecution had knowingly used perjured testimony of David Green-
glass and Benjamin Schneider (the photographer who was a rebuttal witness at the trial), and
that the government failed to prove that the information transmitted to the Soviet Union was
not "generally known." Rosenberg, 200 F.2d at 671.
The publicity point was addressed many years later in Supreme Court decisions that
focused on constitutional aspects of trials contaminated by prejudicial media coverage. Eg.,
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). The Sheppardcase in-
volved trial in a "carnival atmosphere"; the trial judge denied motions for change of venue
and to sequester the jury, and did not adequately direct the jury not to expose themselves to
media coverage. 384 U.S. at 358, 352-53. The Rosenbergs' showing was much weaker, and
no motions for relief were made during the trial. The trial began on March 6, 1951, and the
newspaper clippings submitted as exhibits contained no items between the end of November
1950 and February 21, 1951. Prospective jurors were asked whether they had read about the
case, and the defense did not use all its peremptory challenges. The court of appeals con-
cluded that this point was an afterthought. Counsel's excuse for not raising the point earlier
was that he was so busy with the trial, he read newspapers infrequently, and was unaware of
the extent of the publicity. But if counsel was so unaware, "there is no reason to suppose that
the jury was more seriously affected." Rosenberg, 200 F.2d at 669.
The prosecution's alleged knowing use of perjured testimony by David Greenglass was to
be the focus of a later, last-minute, motion for post-conviction relief, on the basis of "newly
discovered evidence." See z)ia note 138. In this earlier round, the Rosenbergs contended that
Greenglass falsely testified that he had made full disclosure to the FBI on the night of his
arrest. The court of appeals concluded that later statements by David and Ruth Greenglass,
when "read in context," did not show this testimony to have been perjury, let alone perjury
knowingly used by the prosecution. 200 F.2d at 670.
The Rosenbergs also contended that David Greenglass lied when he said he made draw-
ings of lens molds from memory, because defense experts testified that Greenglass could not
have done so because of his limited education. The issue of Greenglass's capacity to make the
drawings had been explored in cross-examination at the trial. The affidavits of four scientists
concerning their opinion of Greenglass's capacity added nothing, because none of them knew
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Perl, a witness before the Rosenberg grand jury, for perjury for falsely
denying that he knew Julius Rosenberg, co-defendant Morton Sobell,
and others mentioned in the trial. The indictment was made public
while Ruth Greenglass was on the stand. The New York Times published
a story quoting Saypol that Perl's expected role as a witness would have
been "to corroborate certain statements made by David Greenglass and
the latter's wife, who are key Government witnesses at the trial."' 0 2 The
Rosenbergs argued that the indictment and the statement to the press
were deliberately timed to shore up the Greenglass's credibility at the
trial. Judge Swan's opinion for the court of appeals declared that Say-
pol's statement, if it was as the Times reported it, "cannot be too severely
condemned" and was "wholly reprehensible."'' 0 3 Still, the court con-
cluded that the Rosenbergs were not entitled to a hearing to determine
whether the statement was made, and whether it affected the jury. The
difficulty was that although the Rosenbergs' attorneys had conferred
with Judge Kaufman during the trial concerning the New York Times
story, they had made no motion for a mistrial or other relief.'0 4 Further,
the issue had not been raised in motions for a new trial or in the previ-
ous appeal. The court of appeals stated that by allowing the trial to
continue, defense counsel had obviously concluded that the prosecutor's
statement to the press had not prejudiced the jury against them. Hav-
ing themselves so concluded, they may not, after an adverse verdict, ask
the court to reach a contrary conclusion. 10 5
At the Supreme Court's conference of April 11, only Justices Black
and Frankfurter voted to grant review of the Rosenbergs' new argu-
ments. 10 6 Justice Burton, who had voted to grant review on the earlier
him and they could not give an opinion on whether the quality of his memory might have
allowed him to make the sketches of drawings he had seen, no matter how inadequate his
education. Id. at 670-71.
Another perjury argument concerned the photographer, Benjamin Schneider. Schneider
testified that he had not seen Julius Rosenberg "before today" when in fact Schneider had
been in the courtroom the previous day, and had observed Rosenberg on the stand. On cross-
examination, defense counsel treated the answer as meaning that Schneider had not seen
Rosenberg between the time he allegedly had taken the passport photos and the time the trial
had begun, rather than as a statement that he had not seen Rosenberg prior to the time the
question was put. Moreover, even if Schneider's testimony was classified as perjury, the issue
was peripheral, because there was little controversy over whether the Rosenbergs had gone to
Schneider's shop. Id at 671.
The last point raised was that the government had failed to prove that the information
conveyed to the Soviet Union was secret. Judge Ryan concluded that, although the theory of
use of atomic energy for explosives was widely known, practical application of the theory was
not common knowledge. 108 F. Supp. at 807-08. The court of appeals agreed. 200 F.2d at
671.
102 200 F.2d at 669.
1o3 Id at 670.
104 Id.
105 Id
106 Parrish, supra note 1, at 822.
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certiorari petition, voted to deny this petition. 0 7 Justice Frankfurter's
notes indicate that he again argued that the death sentences should not
be carried out without the "moral authority that would come from a
finding by this Court" that there were no errors. 08 At his request, the
order denying the petition was held up for six weeks, while he debated
whether to write a dissent that would describe "Saypol's inexcusable
conduct." 10 9 Sometime prior to the Court's conference on May 23, how-
ever, Black and Frankfurter instead agreed to append to the order deny-
ing certiorari a bland statement that "Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, referring to the positions they took when these cases were
here last November, adhere to them."' 10
On Friday, May 22, Justice Douglas circulated a surprise memo-
randum, announcing that he had changed his position and would vote
to review. The memorandum included a proposed dissent from the de-
nial of certiorari, stating:
Mr. Justice Douglas, agreeing with the Court of Appeals that
some of the conduct of the United States Attorney was "wholly repre-
hensible" but believing in disagreement with the Court of Appeals
that it probably prejudiced the defendants seriously, votes to grant
certiorari. 1 11
Frankfurter used the Douglas memorandum to lobby Burton to change
his vote, arguing in a letter to Burton that the Court would now be in a
position of voting to deny review while Douglas, "who has created for
himself the reputation of being especially sensitive to the claims of injus-
tice," publicly announced a dissent on the merits.' 12 At the same time,
in conversation with Jackson, Frankfurter argued that the Douglas dis-
sent would force public acknowledgment of his own dissent as well. Pre-
dictably, 1 3 Jackson assessed Douglas's change of mind as grandstanding
107 Burton, on the first certiorari petition, did not believe that any of the issues would
ultimately require reversal, but that given the strong feelings of Justices Black and Frank-
furter, the issues were sufficiently substantial to require review. See supra note 52. This time,
he concluded that the new issues had less merit, and he voted to deny certiorari. See Parrish,
supra note 1, at 822.
108 Parrish, supra note 1, at 823 (quoting F. Frankfurter, supra note 6, file 7).
109 Id.
110 Parrish, supra note 1, at 823 (quoting F. Frankfurter, supra note 23). The Black-Frank-
furter statement was eventually published with the order denying certiorari on May 25, 1953.
United States v. Rosenberg, 345 U.S. 965, 965-66 (1953). It will be recalled that on denial of
the Rosenbergs' petition for rehearing, following the denial of their first petition for certiorari,
Black had noted his dissent and Frankfurter published a memorandum that did not techni-
cally disclose that he had voted to grant review. 344 U.S. 838, 850, 889-90 (1952); see supra
note 49.
111 Parrish, supra note 1, at 823-24 (quoting W.O. Douglas, Memorandum to the Confer-
ence (May 22, 1953) (available in Harold Burton Papers, Library of Congress, box 248)).
112 Id. at 824 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harold Burton (May 23, 1953)
(available in Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School Library, box 65, file 2)).
113 See infra note 120.
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in "the dirtiest, most shameful, most cynical performance that I think I
have ever heard of in matters pertaining to law."' 114
Frankfurter's letter to Burton was ineffective; Burton again voted to
deny review at the Court's conference the next day. But his conversa-
tion with Jackson bore fruit. At the Court's regular Saturday morning
conference on May 23, Jackson attacked Douglas, declaring that he
would now vote to grant review (making four) in order to quash publi-
cation of Douglas's dissent and to forestall possible leaks to the press
that, at one time or another, four Justices had voted to hear the case.
According to Frankfurter's notes, the conversation had turned to the
scheduling of the case for argument, when Douglas announced he would
withdraw his proposed dissenting memorandum, because it "was badly
drawn" and "[h]e hadn't realized it would embarrass anyone."'" 5 At
this point, Jackson changed his vote again, stating that the reasons for
his vote to review no longer applied once Douglas had withdrawn his
controversial memorandum. 116 There were now only three votes to
grant review. The order denying certiorari, published the following
Monday, contained only the statement that "Mr. Justice Douglas is of
the opinion the petition for certiorari should be granted."' 17
The record shows that Douglas had two changes of heart. After
voting to deny certiorari on April 11, he changed his vote and planned
to publish what could be interpreted as a one sentence dissent on the
merits. Then, when there were four votes to grant certiorari, he an-
nounced that he would not publish the offending sentence but would
simply dissent. Parrish notes that the harshest interpretation of this in-
consistency was the one shared by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson.
Douglas could dissent vigorously from the denial of certiorari, af-
firm his liberal credentials, yet not be required to vote on the case
after full arguments. He withdrew the memorandum in the confer-
ence when it became clear that the Court, above all Jackson, pre-
ferred to hear the case rather than endure a provocative dissent.
Sensing Jackson's motives, Douglas retreated, encouraged Jackson to
switch his vote, and thereby killed the grant of certiorari. 11
Thus the Frankfurter-Jackson view is that Douglas deliberately
withdrew the offending sentence, knowing that this would provoke Jack-
son to change his vote. It is impossible, of course, to rebut conclusively
an assertion about Douglas's state of mind. We have no contemporary
record of Douglas's reasons for offering to withdraw the proposed dissent
114 Parrish, supra note 1, at 825 (quoting F. Frankfurter, supra note 6).
115 Id at 825 (quoting F. Frankfurter, supra note 6, files 6 & 7).
116 Id. (quoting F. Frankfurter, supra note 6, files 8 & 9).
117 345 U.S. 965, 966 (1953). As noted, the Black-Frankfurter statement also appeared.
See supra note 110.
118 Parrish, supra note 1, at 826.
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beyond his admission that it was "badly drawn." Those disposed to
doubt his candor would not be disposed to accept that explanation at
face value. There is other evidence, however, that makes it possible to
conclude that the grandstanding charge has not been proved.
First, the charge attributes contradictory motives to Douglas: that
he wanted to deny review in the case while simultaneously waving the
liberal flag. 1 9 If Douglas truly wanted only to indulge in a grandstand
play, he could have predicted safely that the convictions would be af-
firmed after review on the merits, giving him an opportunity to write a
dissent with even greater effect after the case was argued and full opin-
ions were prepared. Second, it is important to remember the source of
the charge. Although Parrish does not reject the grandstanding expla-
nation, he properly notes that it must be viewed with skepticism, be-
cause it is set forth "in documents prepared by a justice . . .at odds,
personally and ideologically, with Douglas."' 20
Nonetheless, Parrish finds that the Frankfurter-Jackson explanation
has some "credibility," because Douglas withdrew his opinion after it
had become irrelevant; the required four votes for certiorari had been
obtained, negating the opportunity for dissent.
Parrish emphasizes that both Frankfurter's and Burton's papers in-
dicate that the Court had begun to discuss details of scheduling oral
argument before Douglas began to speak of modifying his memoran-
dum. 12 1 This evidence is not conclusive, however; it is important that
119 See infra text accompanying note 157.
120 Parrish, supra note 1, at 826. To say that Frankfurter was "at odds" with Douglas
considerably understates the depth of Frankfurter's antipathy. Frankfurter wrote Learned
Hand in 1954 that Douglas "is the most cynical, shamelessly immoral character I've ever
known." H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 182 (1981) (quoting Letter from
Felix Frankfurter to Learned Hand (Nov. 7, 1954) (available in Learned Hand Papers,
Harvard Law School Library)). Justice Jackson's feelings toward Douglas were even more
extreme than Frankfurter's. A clear indication of Jackson's attitude toward Douglas is his
statement prior to the conference, see infra text accompanying note 114, and his statement
after the conference that "That S.O.B.'s bluff was called." Parrish, supra note 1, at 825 (quot-
ing F. Frankfurter, supra note 6, files 8 & 9).
121 Parrish, supra note 1, at 825.
Parrish notes that Frankfurter "may have embellished his account." Id at 826. One
embellishment contained in the account is a confused explanation, attributed to Douglas, of
Douglas's reason for withdrawal of the memorandum. Frankfurter reported that Black told
him that Douglas had told Black that he withdrew the dissent when it became clear that the
Court was only prepared to grant a hearing on the question whether or not to grant certio-
rari. (Black had not been present at the May 23 conference, although he had left a vote to'
grant certiorari in the Rosenberg case). Frankfurter then reported discussing this with Jackson,
who is said to have responded "that is wholly false. . . . It wasn't that at all. We voted to
grant until Douglas withdrew his memorandum." Id (quoting F. Frankfurter, supra note 6,
file 6). I am not aware that there has ever been a hearing in the Supreme Court on the
question of granting or denying certiorari. There was, however, a later stage of the Rosenberg
case where Douglas was willing to vote to grant certiorari, but not to hold argument on the
question whether to grant a stay. See infta text accompanying note 144. If the Douglas com-
ment to Black was made, it may have been made with reference to that vote, and not as an
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the May 23 conference was not devoted solely to the Rosenberg case.
There were forty-three cases on the agenda for consideration of grant or
denial of review, and in six cases certiorari was granted.122 In addition,
three cases were cleared for delivery with full scale opinions the follow-
ing Monday.1 23 During a busy conference, the Justices' comments are
often quick, informal, and not fully thought out. 124 Even if a steno-
graphic record were available to corroborate one Justice's recollection of
what had been said, isolated comments by any Justice would not pro-
vide reliable clues to his motives.
Even ignoring the context of a busy conference, the corroboration is
thin. The Justices discuss cases in conference in order of seniority, so
that when Jackson began to talk, three senior Justices (Black, who was
absent but had left his vote, Frankfurter, and Douglas) had already indi-
cated that they would vote to grant. When Jackson supplied the fourth
vote, discussion could have turned immediately to the date for argu-
ment. If Douglas wanted to respond to Jackson's attack on his proposed
opinion by offering to withdraw it, he probably would not have had the
opportunity to do so before a discussion of scheduling had begun.
Moreover, Jackson had given two reasons for his vote, including his con-
cern about a possible leak of the fact that four Justices had voted to
grant certiorari on different occasions.12 5 Thus, Douglas could not have
explanation for his withdrawal of the memorandum. If Douglas did make the statement with
reference to his vote in the conference of May 23, it may show that he confused the two votes.
In all of this multiple hearsay, there is no report of the dates of the alleged conversations. The
date of Frankfurter's conversation with Jackson is particularly important. See infia text fol-
lowing note 202.
Parrish also finds some confirmation of the grandstanding hypothesis in Justice Douglas's
reply to a letter Parrish sent him in 1974 which asked the Justice to comment on the May 22
memorandum. "He declined to do so. Instead he provided copies of the Court's official re-
ports for the case and concluded, 'I am puzzled by your inquiry as the Journal entry makes
everything clear.' In my [Parrish's] opinion, the official reports do nothing of the kind." Par-
rish, supra note 1, at 826-27 n.66 (quoting Letter from William 0. Douglas to Michael Parrish
(Dec. 19, 1974)). Even if Douglas, who usually kept no notes of the details of conference
discussions, remembered what happened in a conference held 20 years before, it would be
unthinkable for a sittingJustice to discuss the details of a court conference with a scholar or to
justify his position.
122 See 345 U.S. 962-68 (1952) for citations of cases in which the Court made brief dispo-
sitions on May 25, 1953.
123 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594 (1953); United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953).
124 That events moved fast in this conference is underlined by Parrish's characterization
of Frankfurter's notes as concluding that "[t]he conference dissolved in confusion, with no
one, save perhaps Douglas, certain whether he had rejoined those voting to deny review or
whether he remained in dissent." Parrish, supra note 1, at 825. Obviously, if there was confu-
sion, it was straightened out by the time the order was published the following Monday,
containing Douglas's explicit dissent, but without opinion.
125 Jackson's concern about leaking of votes if certiorari were denied, which I do not
believe to be a serious reason for Jackson's initial vote to grant, may also have been intended
as a rebuke of Douglas. Jackson was accusing one or more of his colleagues of indiscretion or
worse. In his autobiography, Douglas recalls that Drew Pearson, a newspaper reporter, pre-
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:211
been sure that withdrawal of his "badly drawn" opinion would cause
Jackson to change his vote again.
The most likely explanation for Douglas's two changes of heart is
quite unremarkable. Douglas took a fresh look at the briefs in the Rosen-
berg case 126 a few days before the scheduled May 23 conference, and
came to a different conclusion about the substantiality of the issue. 127
dicted the decision in Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945), on the day before the case was
to come down. At the conference, where it was decided to put off decision for a week or two,
Frankfurter charged Douglas, Black, and Murphy with leaking the story to Pearson. Douglas
was convinced that Frankfurter persuaded Justice Roberts that his charges were accurate "to
such an extent that Roberts refused to shake hands or speak to Black, Murphy and me, and
that condition continued until he resigned from the Court." W.O. DOUGLAS, supranote 8, at
32-33. Douglas told the same story to me in 1956, and the charge of leaking Court secrets still
rankled.
The Frankfurter papers confirm that Frankfurter did have extensive conversations with
Roberts about Douglas's alleged misbehavior. B. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN
AND HIS SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY (1983) quotes a letter from Roberts to
Frankfurter in 1954, nine years after Roberts resigned, stressing the need "to keep people like
Douglas from making the Court the stepping stone to the presidency." Id at 55 (quoting
Letter from Owen Roberts to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 2, 1954) (available in Frankfurter Pa-
pers, Library of Congress)).
126 In preparing for conference, Douglas normally would have the cart containing the
briefs of all cases scheduled for discussion wheeled into his office two days before the confer-
ence. He would also have the law clerk's memorandum in every case in which the Court was
to decide whether to schedule the case for argument. Professor Charles Ares, who clerked for
Justice Douglas in the 1952-1953 Term, informed me that he did not prepare a new memo-
randum for Douglas on the Rosenberg case for the May 23 conference, and was unaware that
Douglas had prepared and circulated his May 22 memorandum. Douglas might well have
reread the Rosenberg briefs because the case was on the conference schedule. Discussions at the
conference six weeks earlier may have led him to concentrate on the impact of Saypol's press
conference, and to form a different opinion about the importance of this particular issue.
127 The court of appeals had relied on the fact that the Rosenbergs' lawyers had made a
conscious decision not to object to Saypol's statements to the press. Douglas did not believe
that the blunders of counsel should foreclose appellate correction of errors seriously prejudic-
ing criminal defendants. See, e.g., Daniels v. Allen, decided sub nom. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 548-54 (1953) (federal habeas corpus not available to challenge allegedly coerced confes-
sion when appeal to state court was filed one day later); Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91
(1955) (late attack on grand jury composition in state court forecloses Supreme Court review).
Douglas dissented in both Daniels, 344 U.S. at 513 (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas,
J.); and Michel, 350 U.S. at 104 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J., and Warren,
C.j.).
In Rosenberg, however, the defense counsel consciously decided not to object. The court of
appeals opinion relied on the failure to object as demonstrating counsel's judgment that Say-
pol's remarks had not prejudiced their clients' trial. Douglas's proposed dissent focused on
whether the Rosenbergs' trial had been prejudiced, and not on whether their lawyers had
waived the point. On the prejudice issue, Douglas may have had reason to suspect the capac-
ity of the Rosenberg lawyers to make the judgment that their clients had not been prejudiced.
In his autobiography, Douglas opines that Emanuel Bloch's strategy in the case went beyond
incompetence, resting on "the Communist consensus of that day. . . that it was best for the
cause that the Rosenbergs pay the extreme price." W.O. DOUGLAS, supra note 8, at 79.
In the court of appeals, the lame explanation offered for failure to object or move for
mistrial was that Saypol had explained in the in camera session that he had not deliberately
timed the indictment to buttress Greenglass's credibility at the trial. But, as the court of
appeals explained, the issue was not whether Saypol's motives were suspect in the timing of
234
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He immediately wrote and circulated the memorandum of May 22, but
it did not say precisely what he meant to say. He probably meant only
to say that the publicity issue was substantial and merited review, but
his proposed dissent was poorly drafted and could have been read as a
dissent on the merits. He could not have spent sufficient time on the
case to justify taking a position on the merits and recommending rever-
sal of the decision below. Even if it were established that Saypol's con-
duct had adversely affected the Rosenbergs' trial, defense counsel's
failure to raise the issue at trial had not been inadvertent. A serious
question remained: whether the Rosenbergs' trial lawyers should be al-
lowed to play the issue both ways by gambling on acquittal and al-
lowing the trial to continue, then seeking to resurrect the buried error to
get the resulting conviction set aside. A snap dissent on the merits was
unjustifiable, and as soon as his proposed dissent was attacked, Douglas
realized that the dissent, as worded, was inappropriate. He responded
by offering to withdraw it. 128
Parrish concedes that, "possibly," this prosaic explanation of events
is a "reasonable interpretation," and that Douglas might have acted
"without devious motives." 129 He argues, however, that this explanation
leaves Douglas's conduct "inexplicable in view of his own later apparent
interest in the case."
[R]egardless of the presence or absence of a formal vote to hear
the case (assuming he cared about the Rosenbergs' petition), Douglas
becomes a timid poker player whose bluff had been called. His
Perl's indictment, but whether Saypol's press release had prejudiced the trial. R. RADOSH &
J. MILTON, supra note 9, at 206, state:
The failure of any of the defense attorneys to make a formal objection over
this incident is striking. . . .Manny Bloch and the rest of the defense team
had certainly not been hesitant to make objections and even motions for mis-
trial over relatively minor points, .... One can only wonder whether Say-
pol mollified the opposition lawyers by promising that Perl would not be
called to testify at the trial. In reality this was hardly a concession, since Perl
had shown no indication of admitting any involvement with Rosenberg or
Sobell, but of course the defense could not have known this. Whatever Say-
pol may have said off the record, the defense made a serious blunder in ac-
cepting his assurances.
Whatever the reason for failing to move for a mistrial, serious difficulties arise when
defense counsel ask to have a conviction set aside after consciously choosing to let the trial
proceed to judgment. The difficulties are most serious when the failure to object is made for
tactical reasons, even if those reasons are not an attempt to "sandbag" by saving an objection
for a later appeal. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 450 (1965) (noting that deliberate
choice to waive an objection may foreclose federal relief of state court judgments).
128 Frankfurter's decision not to publish a dissent criticizing Saypol, he explained, was
motivated by his desire not to let what he wrote in dissent become grist for the propaganda
mills of the Communist Party, or to create the impression that the Rosenbergs "were con-
victed though innocent." Parrish, supra note I, at 823 (quoting F. Frankfurter, supmra note 23).
It is doubtful that similar reasoning would have persuaded Douglas not to publish his pro-
posed dissent.
129 Parrish, supra note 1, at 826.
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threatened dissent had forced the Court to reconsider its denial of re-
view. He thus entered the conference with a strong hand. And, from
all we know of his behavior in other cases, Douglas thrived on tough
intellectual combat, enjoyed the role of dissenter, and was not easily
intimidated by his colleagues' wrath. Certainly Douglas was no stran-
ger to the rough-and-tumble of Court politics, and he knew how to
round up votes. Franklin Roosevelt believed him to be one of the best
poker players in Washington.130
For the second time, Parrish makes an unfounded assumption con-
cerning the way Douglas usually behaved.13 1 Here, Parrish assumes
that Douglas played Machiavellian games to round up votes in confer-
ence for positions he favored. Douglas was a superb poker player, but
on the Court he stated and voted his honest convictions and left the
business of winning converts and votes to others. Felix Frankfurter
could argue with Burton to change his vote to protect the integrity of
the Court on the same day that he talked to Jackson about changing his
vote to block Douglas from grandstanding. But Douglas did not "work
that way."' 3 2 As Frankfurter himself remarked in his Rosenberg memo-
randum, on the vote to grant or deny certiorari Douglas usually cast his
vote without extended explanation. 3 3 If Douglas was convinced by the
discussion that his proposed dissent was flawed, he withdrew it because
it ought not be published; he was not "intimidated"13 4 into doing so.
In short, in this second round of the Rosenberg case, Douglas did
make two mistakes. At first, he failed to recognize that the issue con-
cerning Saypol's press release was substantial. Later, he proposed a dis-
sent that, as worded, might be read as a dissent on the merits of that
issue. If he can be criticized for making these mistakes, there should be
no basis for surprise or criticism that he corrected them. Parrish's unfa-
vorable judgment ultimately rests on Frankfurter's and Jackson's attri-
bution of devious methods to Douglas. The opinions of these Justices,
who were "at odds, personally and ideologically, with Douglas,' 335 are
insufficient to support Parrish's critical appraisal of Justice Douglas.
C. The Second Motion for Post-Conviction Relief
When the Supreme Court denied the Rosenbergs' second petition
for certiorari on May 25, 1953, only three weeks remained until the
Court's adjournment for the 1952 term. In those weeks, the district
court and the court of appeals denied two additional motions to vacate
130 Id
131 Parrish's first unfounded assumption was that Douglas could be expected to vote to
grant review in all death penalty cases. See supra text accompanying notes 27-43.
132 See supra note 39.
133 See supra note 53.
134 Parrish, supra note 1, at 826.
135 Id.; see also supra note 120.
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judgment and sentence and a mandamus petition to require Judge
Kaufman to resentence the defendants. 136 The crux of the new motions
was a renewal of the claim that David Greenglass had committed per-
jury and that the government must have known of it. 137 In support of
this claim, the Rosenbergs made three contentions regarding newly dis-
covered evidence. 138 Both lower courts concluded that the alleged per-
jury affected only peripheral issues at trial, and held that the affidavits
of newly discovered evidence did not justify a hearing because they
demonstrated neither deliberate falsehood by Greenglass nor
prosecutorial knowledge of any falsehoods. 139
On June 12, the Rosenbergs' counsel sought a stay of execution in
order to obtain Supreme Court review of the unfavorable lower court
decisions. 14° Douglas voted against hearing oral argument on the stay
application. Parrish describes this vote as "intransigence" that "clearly
doomed the application."' 4' At a June 13 conference, four Justices had
voted to set the application for a stay for oral argument on June 15.
Douglas's negative vote prevented oral argument on the stay, and the
stay was denied. 142 At the same June 13 conference, however, the Court
136 The Rosenbergs' second attempt for post-conviction relief, as well as their first mo-
tion, was brought under 28 U.S.c. § 2255 (1982). The mandamus action was filed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982).
137 The issues raised are described in detail in W. SCHNEIR & M. SCHNEIR, supra note 15,
at 196-212. These issues were also raised in the Rosenbergs' first motion for post-conviction
relief. See supra note 101.
138 David Greenglass had testified at trial concerning gifts given to the Rosenbergs by the
Soviets for espionage activities, including a console table that had been hollowed out for a
lamp to fit underneath. The Rosenbergs denied the table had been hollowed out, and testi-
fied that it had been bought at Macy's for about $21 in 1944 or 1945. The defense claimed to
have located the actual table, and supplied an affidavit of a Macy's employee who, on the
basis of a photograph, identified the table as of a kind sold by Macy's during 1944 and 1945
for about $20.
Additional new evidence involved purloined memoranda from the files of Greenglass's
lawyer submitted to demonstrate that Greenglass had told his lawyers that he had made
deliberately confusing statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to protect his
wife. The memoranda contradicted his trial testimony that he had made full disclosure to the
FBI on the night of his arrest. See supra note 101.
The third item of new evidence was an affidavit from Greenglass's brother stating that
David Greenglass had told him that he had taken a sample of uranium from Los Alamos
without permission of the authorities. The defense theory was that this provided a motive for
perjury: in order to escape detection for his own separate act of espionage, David Greenglass
implicated the innocent Rosenbergs.
139 United States v. Rosenberg, 204 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1953).
140 The chronology of events appears in Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 279-
80 (1953). Justice Jackson recommended that the application for stay be set for hearing on
June 15 before the entire Court. Rosenberg v. United States, 345 U.S. 989 (1953). John
Finerty, a longtime civil rights lawyer, and Professor Malcolm Sharp joined the defense team
for these motions and for the later motions filed by the Rosenberg lawyers. R. RADOSH & J.
MILTON, supra note 9, at 372; see also M. SHARP, WAS JUSTICE DONE? 106-07 (1956) (describ-
ing merits of three denied motions and subsequent motion for new trial).
141 Parrish, supra note 1, at 832; see also J. SIMON, supra note 5, at 305.
142 345 U.S. at 989.
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also considered and rejected the Rosenbergs' petition for rehearing of
the second denial of certiorari. 143 Douglas's opinion disclosed that he
had voted to grant the petition for rehearing and certiorari, but voted
against hearing argument on the stay. 144
Douglas voted to grant the second certiorari petition because he
believed it presented substantial legal questions; once the petition was
denied, Douglas saw no further substantial questions and, therefore, no
reason to stay the execution. Douglas's supposed "intransigence" was,
in fact, one more example of his consistent pattern: he would vote to
review only if there were issues of substance to be decided. Douglas
believed that the portion of the second petition for certiorari based on
Saypol's alleged misconduct in publicizing Perl's indictment presented
substantial issues. 14 5 Douglas had not been impressed, however, with
the other claim in the second certiorari petition that the prosecution
knowingly used Greenglass's perjured testimony. The stay application
was based on the use of the perjured testimony, an issue that Douglas
believed insubstantial. Douglas was not prepared to vote for a stay of
execution to allow further consideration of an issue he judged insubstan-
tial, and the Court was not willing to entertain the issue of Saypol's
publicizing the indictment. Accordingly, Douglas voted against the new
applications.
Parrish's judgment about Douglas's behavior is apparently based
on a misapprehension that Douglas's votes on June 13 were inconsistent:
a vote to review the latest petition on the the merits, coupled with a vote
not to hold an oral argument which might have convinced other Justices
to cast their votes for review. "Douglas would grant a stay but dismissed
the necessity for any argument."' 46 This misapprehension rests on con-
fusion of Douglas's position in the two cases that were treated together
in the June 13 conference. 47 The first case was the petition for rehear-
143 Rosenberg v. United States, 345 U.S. 1003 (1953). Justice Black again noted his dis-
sent, and Justice Frankfurter appended another memo referring to his "unbroken practice"
not to note dissent from denial, asserting that "[p]artial disclosure of votes on successive stages
of a certiorari proceeding does not present an accurate picture of what took place." Id. at
1004. Justice Douglas's opinion on the denial of the stay was also a recorded dissent from the
denial of rehearing.
144 Mr. Justice Douglas would grant a stay and hear the case on the merits, as he
thinks the petition for certiorari and the petition for rehearing present sub-
stantial questions. But since the Court has decided not to take the case [i.e.,
the second petition for certiorari], there would be no end served by hearing
oral argument on the motion for a stay. For the motion presents no new
substantial question not presented by the petition for certiorari and by the
petition for rehearing.
Id. at 989.
145 See supra text accompanying note 111.
146 Parrish, supra note 1, at 832.
147 The confusion is partially a result of the fact that the two decisions were announced
the same day and are reported 14 pages apart in United States Reports. The decision denying
rehearing is reported at 345 U.S. 1003 (1953). The decision denying the application for a stay
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ing of the denial of certiorari on May 25, in which Douglas's ultimate
position had been to grant certiorari. 148 He adhered to this position in
the June 13 conference by voting to grant rehearing and to grant a stay
pending argument in the October Term. In the second case the defense
sought a stay, pending the filing of briefs to review the latest court of
appeals decisions denying the motions based on newly discovered evi-
dence. For this case, the issue before the Supreme Court did not con-
cern whether the merits of the lower court decisions would be orally
argued. 149 Rather, the question was whether the stay application would
be decided solely on the basis of the papers filed with the Court and the
lower court opinions. Defense counsel proposed, in effect, an extraordi-
nary oral argument on the question whether or not to grant
certiorari. 150
When Douglas concluded that a stay of execution based solely on
the new motion was not justified by any new "substantial question," he
naturally voted against holding oral argument on the question whether
the stay should be granted to allow further consideration of the perjury
issue.' 15 He was willing to stay the execution to allow review of the
earlier petition for certiorari, because he believed the alleged
is reported at 345 U.S. 989 (1953). (The Supreme Court's Journal commonly places denials
of rehearing at the end of the list of a day's decisions.) Douglas's opinion on the denial of the
stay was an opinion addressed to both cases, and was a recorded dissent from the denial of
rehearing. See supra note 144.
148 See supra text accompanying note 111.
149 Simon states that Douglas's vote against the stay "guaranteed that the Rosenbergs
would not be heard in the Supreme Court on the new point of law raised by their attorneys."
J. SIMON, supra note 5, at 305. The proposed hearing on June 15 would have focused solely
on the question whether a stay should be issued pending filing of briefs on the merits. Al-
though Douglas's vote was to deny the stay and not to hold a hearing for this purpose, an
affirmative vote would not have guaranteed a hearing in the Court on the merits.
150 See supra note 121.
151 The gist of the claim was that the prosecution had used Greenglass's testimony, know-
ing that the witness was lying. To convene a hearing that would delay the execution, the
affidavits had to do more than raise a triable issue of fact as to the veracity of Greenglass's
testimony. The Rosenbergs' counsel needed to show a tenable basis for a conclusion that the
testimony was knowingly false, that the prosecution was aware of it, and that the false testi-
mony was significant. At two points, Parrish glosses over these requirements. He concedes
that the mere proof that the Macy's table referred to in Greenglass's testimony had not been
hollowed out could not demonstrate that "the Greenglasses had lied, or more crucially, that
the prosecution had known of their perjury." Parrish, supra note 1, at 829-30. Nevertheless,
he says that "[t]he fact that Macy's sold the table in 1944 or 1945 did not resolve the issue of
who had purchased it-the Rosenbergs, a friend, or the Russians? These were issues that
could be settled only in the course of a formal hearing ... " Id. at 830. He also states that
the memoranda of Greenglass's counsel "did not present a prima facie case of perjury but did
raise serious questions about the Greenglasses' credibility." Id. Of course, all of the "newly
discovered evidence" might well have been admitted at the original trial. But, even if one
accepts the proposition that the failure to discover this evidence earlier was not the result of
lack of diligence, and that the evidence would have bolstered the defense case at the original
trial, that would not require a hearing on the Rosenbergs' § 2255 motion, nor would it justify
a stay to require that hearing.
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prosecutorial misconduct raised a substantial issue. These positions are
not inconsistent. They are, instead, part of Douglas's consistent pattern
of voting to review or deny review in the Rosenberg cases depending on
his assessment of the substantiality of the issues raised.
D. The Original Writ of Habeas Corpus
Douglas's last vote against Supreme Court review in the Rosenberg
cases occurred in a conference held on the afternoon of June 14, after
the Court's regular term had adjourned. On that day, defense counsel
applied for permission to file an original writ of habeas corpus based on
two grounds: the Saypol press conference and the knowing use of
Greenglass's perjured testimony. This was, of course, a rerun of the two
battles that had been lost that morning when the Court denied the peti-
tion for rehearing and the application for a stay.
The results were predictable. Justices Black and Frankfurter, who
had voted to grant review at every stage in the cases, voted to grant
permission to file the writ of habeas corpus. Black, who had noted his
dissent at every previous stage, did so again. Frankfurter wrote a memo-
randum, stating that he would set the application for oral argument the
next day because "[o]ral argument frequently has a force beyond what
the written word conveys."' 152 Douglas, who that morning had issued an
opinion explaining that there was no point in hearing a motion that
presented no new substantial question, voted to deny permission to file
the writ. 153 Douglas had earlier voted to review the case solely on the
basis of the Saypol incident,154 but had refused to vote for oral argu-
ment on the question of whether the lower court opinions denying the
second motion for post-conviction relief should be reviewed.' 5 5 He had
consistently found no merit in the claim that the prosecution knowingly
used Greenglass's perjured testimony, 156 and he probably reached the
same conclusion again.
All of this is quite unremarkable, but Parrish sees it as confirmation
for the judgments of Frankfurter and Jackson that
Douglas had contradictory motives in the Rosenberg litigation. On
the one hand, he worked to retain his image as a liberal tribune who,
when necessary, fought alone on behalf of the oppressed. On the
other, he thwarted collective efforts to review the case. "Every time a
vote could have been had for a hearing," Jackson complained, accord-
ing to Frankfurter, "Douglas opposed a hearing in open Court, and
only when it was perfectly clear that a particular application would
152 346 U.S. at 272.
153 Id. at 271.
154 Rosenberg v. United States, 345 U.S.-965, 966 (1953).
155 Rosenberg v. United States, 345 U.S. 1003 (1953).
156 See supra text accompanying note 145.
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not be granted, did he take a position for granting it."' 157
It is hard to see how this last vote sustains such a conclusion. There
were, apparently, only two votes to set the original habeas corpus appli-
cation for hearing. If Douglas had conformed to Jackson's caricatures,
he would once again have dissented, as he had on May 25, without
providing a fourth vote for hearing.
Parrish says that Justice Douglas's predictable vote on the petition
"surprised Frankfurter" and he greeted it with "amazement."1 58 One
source of Frankfurter's surprise concerns a reported debate between
Douglas and Frankfurter over the interpretation of the 1935 decision in
Moone, v. Holohcan.159 In Mooney, the Court held that a state conviction
obtained through the prosecution's knowing use of perjured testimony
could be reviewed by a federal writ of habeas corpus.
Frankfurter became so agitated by this dialogue with Douglas that he
made a longhand transcript on the back of an envelope:
Douglas: "[You've] got to do more than use perjured testimony,
[you've] got to manufacture it."
Frankfurter: "Oh! no! Oh! no! [The] knowing use of perjured testi-
mony is enough. I know a great deal about Mooney."
Even Jackson, who voted against habeas corpus, tried to convince
Douglas that Finerty [one of the Rosenbergs' lawyers] had partici-
pated in the Mooney case and modeled his claims on that precedent;
but Douglas, according to Frankfurter, remained adamant: "He
couldn't see .. .that Finerty's pleadings here went to anything that
he would call jurisdictional. He was still willing to grant certiorari,
but could not see how these allegations could be entertained on
habeas corpus."
Douglas's resistence to Finerty's application no doubt surprised
Frankfurter because only a year before Douglas and Black had rested
a dissent upon the principles of the Mooney case. 160
The most significant point to be made about this reported ex-
change is that its outcome did not control the question of whether the
Court should transfer the application to a lower court for a hearing, or
whether the Court should hear further argument on whether or not to
transfer the application. That morning, the Court had denied a stay
that, if granted, would have allowed the Supreme Court to consider re-
viewing the denial of substantially identical petitions by the lower fed-
eral courts. It would be quite extraordinary for the Court now to
entertain an original writ of habeas corpus and require that the lower
157 Parrish, supra note 1, at 833 (quoting F. Frankfurter, supra note 6).
158 Parrish, supra note 1, at 833.
159 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
160 Parrish, supra note 1, at 833 (citing F. Frankfurter, supra note 6; and F. Frankfurter,
Notes of meeting with W.O.D. (June 19, 1953) (available in Frankfurter Papers, Harvard
Law School Library, box 65, file 2)).
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courts hold hearings on the allegations concerning Greenglass's alleged
perjury.1 6 1 Regardless of Mooney, the Rosenbergs' problem was that
their affidavits of newly discovered evidence went to collateral issues,
failed to make out a prima facie case of deliberate perjury, and con-
tained only conclusionary allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. 62
If the debate about Mooney did occur as described, it has to be con-
ceded that Frankfurter was correct on the law. Still, it is easy to make
sense of Douglas's argument because there was room for legitimate de-
bate as to whether all procedural due process violations could be the
basis of collateral attack through a writ of habeas corpus. 6 3 In the
1950s, Douglas continued to use the earlier habeas corpus idiom of "ju-
risdiction," which carries implications that not all constitutional viola-
tions occurring at trial can be remedied through habeas corpus. 164 In
short, it was not uncharacteristic for Douglas to be arguing for a narrow
construction of the writ of habeas corpus.' 65 In any event, Douglas's
161 Justice Frankfurter said as much in his dissent from the summary denial of the
application:
The disposition of an application to this Court for habeas corpus is so
rarely to be made by this Court directly that Congress has given the Court
authority to transfer such an application to an appropriate district court. [ci-
tation omitted] I do not favor such a disposition of this application because
the substance of the allegations now made has already been considered by the
District Court for the Southern District of New York and on review by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Neither can I join the Court in
denying the application without more.
346 U.S. at 271-72.
162 See supra note 151.
163 There also may have been room for argument concerning whether mere passive
prosecutorial knowledge of perjury was sufficient to establish a due process violation. In 1953,
the Moonq principle had not been elaborated by the Supreme Court since it had been an-
nounced in 1935. The Court's brief opinion in that case had talked about "depriving a de-
fendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of
testimony known to be perjured." 294 U.S. at 112 (emphasis added).
164 The decision in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) was handed down less than two
months earlier. In terms of later developments concerning the scope of habeas corpus, Brown
v. Allen's most significant holding was that introduction of a coerced confession at a criminal
trial was an issue open in habeas corpus; earlier cases had all involved due process issues that
could not have been raised at trial and on appeal. Later cases read the decision as making
habeas corpus available for all issues of constitutional dimension. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 414 (1963). But Justice Reed's opinion for the Court, despite its length, did not even
mention that it was expanding the grounds available to invoke the writ. The opinion dealt
with whether procedural defaults in the state courts would bar habeas corpus, and whether
the asserted claims established violations of due process. Justice Black's dissent, joined by
Justice Douglas, 344 U.S. at 548, and Justice Frankfurter's dissent, joined by Justices Black
and Douglas, 345 U.S. at 570, focused on the procedural default issue. If the opinions of the
Justices are any guide, few members of the Court focused on the decision's most important
point: that all constitutional violations provide a basis for granting habeas corpus. But see
345 U.S. at 546-47 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Whatever the scope of habeas corpus relief for state prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
debate continued over whether the remedy for federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was
as broad. See, e.g., Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
165 In P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S
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quarrel with Frankfurter concerned a point that was not central to the
question of whether the latest petition for review should be granted.
Parrish believes that Douglas's interpretation of Moong carries spe-
cial significance because Douglas had joined a Black dissent the previous
year which "rested. . . upon the principles of the Mooney case."' 16 6 That
case, Remington v. United States, 167 was not a collateral attack on a convic-
tion. The court of appeals there had reversed the defendant's convic-
tion, but also had rejected an argument that the indictment should be
dismissed. Defendants petitioned for certiorari to review the court's re-
fusal to order the indictment dismissed. Their claims had nothing to do
with knowing use of perjured testimony. Rather, the defense alleged
that the foreman of the indicting grand jury was engaged in a book-
publishing venture with the chief prosecuting witness, and that the
United States attorney had deliberately withheld and sought to suppress
evidence of that fact. These two sentences of Black's dissent from the
denial of certiorari contained the reference to Moone. "Governmental
conduct here charged is abhorrent to a fair administration of justice. It
approaches the type of practices unanimously condemned by this Court
as a violation of due process of law in Mooney v. Holohan ....
The Remington dissent thus dealt neither with the extent of
prosecutorial involvement in perjured testimony necessary to establish a
due process violation, nor with the scope of habeas corpus. Even if
Douglas remembered these two sentences in a dissent from a denial of
certiorari he had joined fifteen months before, 169 they would not be in-
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1471 (2d ed. 1973), the authors conclude
that the Court "abandoned the kissing of the jurisdictional book" in Waley v. Johnston, 316
U.S. 101 (1942), where the Court stated that habeas corpus was not limited to those cases in
which a judgment of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction. In Whelchel v. McDonald,
340 U.S. 122 (1950), however, the Court held that habeas corpus was not available to try a
claim that a court-martial proceeding had improperly rejected an insanity defense. Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, stated:
We put to one side the due process issue which respondent presses, for we
think it plain from the law governing court-martial procedure that there must
be afforded a defendant at some point of time an opportunity to tender the
issue of insanity. It is only a denial of that opportunity which goes to the
question of jurisdiction.
Id. at 124 (emphasis added). Douglas's continued use of the language of jurisdiction in
habeas corpus cases was not limited to petitions for review of military service court martial
convictions. In his dissent in Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957), Douglas concluded that
the failure to allow Chessman to participate in the hearing to settle the record did not go "to
jurisdiction (as it- must for habeas corpus to issue)." 354 U.S. at 172 (footnote omitted).
166 Parrish, supra note 1, at 833
167 343 U.S. 907 (1952).
168 Id. at 908.
169 Parrish's full statement, which is excerpted supra text accompanying note 158, is that
Douglas's position "no doubt surprised Frankfurter because only a year before Douglas and
Black had rested a dissent upon the principles of the Mooney case." Parrish, supra note 1, at
833. This was only a brief dissent to a denial of certiorari, and not a dissent in a case that had
been argued on the merits. Moreover, the dissent was written by Black, although Douglas
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consistent with his stated views on Moone or on the scope of the writ of
habeas corpus. In judging the significance of the fact that Frankfurter
had the better of the argument over a peripheral point of law, we are
left with Frankfurter's characterization that Douglas expressed his posi-
tion "quite vehemently," and Parrish's conclusion that the debate was
"acrimonious."' 70 If Frankfurter's characterization of Douglas's vehe-
mence is accurate,171 it is a commentary on the relationship between
Justices Frankfurter and Douglas, which, in turn, helps to explain the
character of some of their debates in conference. It does not lend sup-
port to the hypothesis that Douglas was not dealing with the Rosenberg
cases on their merits. Once again, the habeas corpus vote demonstrates
that Douglas consistently approached the Rosenberg cases according to
the issues raised. He was prepared to vote for Supreme Court review if
an issue was substantial, but not to vote for review merely to delay the
execution or put the Court's imprimatur on the conviction and sentence.
E. The Douglas Stay
The last acts of the Rosenberg tragedy are recounted in the United
States Reports.172 Only a brief account is necessary here. On Sunday,
June 14, Judge Kaufman received a next friend habeas corpus petition.
Fyke Farmer, a Nashville, Tennessee, lawyer, filed the petition on behalf
of one Irwin Edelman. t73 The petition raised a new issue on behalf of
joined it. Frankfurter may have had more reason to remember Remington than Douglas did,
because he appended a memorandum in that case referring to his practice of not noting
dissent from denial of certiorari. If, as in the Rosenberg cases, this was a signal that he had
voted to grant certiorari, he would have been the third vote in favor of granting certiorari in
Remington and therefore it is likely that he had strong feelings about the case.
170 Parrish, supra note 1, at 833 (citing F. Frankfurter, supra note 6).
171 Frankfurter noted Douglas's "vehemence" on other occasions. In describing the
Court's conference on the Rosenbergs' first petition for certiorari, Parrish highlights Douglas's
negative votes with Frankfurter's observation that Douglas cast his vote to deny certiorari
with "startling vehemence" and his vote to deny rehearing "with unwonted vehemence."
Parrish, supra note 1, at 817. When a vote was taken on the second certiorari petition, Frank-
furter again reported that Douglas's vote to deny review was delivered "in the same harsh
tone." Id. at 822. Simon also credits the report that Douglas's tone of voice, as described by
Frankfurter, has some importance. J. SIMON, supra note 5, at 300. If a speaker's tone of voice
is significant, it is not clear that Justice Frankfurter is a reliable witness to the nuance of that
tone, especially when the speaker is Justice Douglas. Parrish notes that Burton's diary "con-
firm[s] much of Frankfurter's account," of the first certiorari vote, but according to Parrish,
what Burton's diary states is simply that he voted to grant and "at that time Douglas voted to
deny." Parrish, supra note 1, at 817. Burton's diary does not confirm what Douglas said, or
what his tone of voice was.
172 United States v. Rosenberg, 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
173 The story of Edelman's and Farmer's involvement in the Rosenbergs' defense is best
told in R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, supra note 9, at 381-402. Edelman was a former Commu-
nist, who had been expelled from the Party. He had circulated a pamphlet at his own ex-
pense, focusing on another issue that the defense team had not raised: that Emanuel Bloch
had blundered by calling for impoundment of David Greenglass's lens mold sketch when it
was introduced by the prosecution, causing it to be omitted from the transcript. Edelman
was rebuffed by the Rosenberg defense committee for his criticism of the defense strategy, but
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the Rosenbergs, one the regular defense team had refused to make.1 74
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 provided the death penalty for trans-
mission of atomic secrets to other nations, but only when recommended
by the jury and in cases where the offense was committed with intent to
injure the United States.1 75 Because the prosecution alleged that the
Rosenbergs' conspiracy continued beyond the date of passage of that
Act, Farmer argued that the lesser penalties therein provided were ap-
plicable to the Rosenbergs. Judge Kaufman denied the petition the
next day, without hearing argument. 176
On Tuesday morning, June 16, Farmer went to Washington, hop-
ing to obtain a stay of execution from a Supreme Court Justice. Learn-
ing that the Rosenberg defense team had presented a petition for a stay
to Douglas the day before, Farmer also presented Douglas with a stay
application. Douglas worked around the clock, studying the new appli-
cation; and he prepared an opinion that was to fill eight pages in the
United States Reports. 177 The next morning, he granted Farmer's applica-
tion for a stay, although he denied the stay application presented by the
Rosenbergs' counsel.1 78 Douglas then left Washington on a cross-coun-
try automobile trip. Late that same day, however, the Chief Justice
convened the Court in Special Term to consider vacating Douglas's
stay. 79 The case was argued on Thursday, June 18, with the argument
limited to whether Edelman had standing to petition as next friend and
whether the penalty provisions of the Atomic Energy Act were
applicable. 180
his pamphlet came to Farmer's attention, and Farmer was impressed by the argument.
Farmer did some research, and formulated the argument concerning the Atomic Energy Act
that was later to convince Douglas to issue a stay. Id.
174 Farmer brought the issues concerning the lens mold omission and the Atomic Energy
Act to the attention of the Rosenberg defense team, but Emanuel Bloch replied that it would
be inadvisable to press those issues until there was a ruling by the Supreme Court on petitions
pending before it. Bloch formally presented the substance of the two issues to Judge Kauf-
man, but in a manner suggesting that the issues were not substantial and were being raised
only so the defense team would leave no stone unturned. Bloch objected to Farmer's plan to
file the next friend petition, and sent a telegram to Judge Kaufman denouncing the petition
and asking the judge not to consider it. Id.
175 Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 585, § 10(b)(2)-(3), 60 Stat. 755, 766-67
(amended 1954).
176 R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, supra note 9, at 394.
177 Rosenberg, 346 U.S. at 313-21 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
178 See infra note 194.
'79 346 U.S. at 282-83; R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, supra note 10, at 400-03.
180 Farmer had only 17 minutes of the argument time given to the Rosenbergs' side. R.
RADOSH &J. MILTON, supra note 9, at 406. Douglas states in his autobiography that after he
had granted the stay, Bloch's brief against vacating the stay "did not even then rest on the
key point made by Fyke Farmer." W.O. DOUGLAS, supra note 8, at 79. Douglas's statement is
confirmed by Radosh and Milton, who relate that Bloch still argued with Farmer on the
morning of the argument that it "would be a fatal mistake to insist upon the applicability of
the Atomic Energy Act" because the point had no merit. R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, supra
note 9, at 404. The defense was instructed by the Court to limit itself to two issues, Edelman's
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The Court announced its decision vacating Justice Douglas's stay
at noon the next day, Friday, June 19.181 The Court resolved the
Atomic Energy Act issue against the Rosenbergs. 18 2 Later that day, the
Court denied a final application for a stay pending further petitions for
executive clemency. 8 3 Defense counsel requested that the Rosenbergs
not be executed on the Jewish Sabbath. The Attorney General an-
nounced that the request would be honored by moving their execution
forward from 11:00 P.M. to 8:00 P.M. that evening, minutes before sun-
down.' 84 Two opinions in the case were not even filed until after the
executions. 185
standing and the Atomic Energy Act point, but John H. Finerty spent his time denouncing
Judge Kaufman and prosecutor Irving Saypol; Daniel Marshall continued in the same vein;
and Bloch pleaded for more time to study the Atomic Energy Act issue. Justice Black asked
Bloch from the bench: "[D]on't you think you ought to espouse [these issues] rather than
denigrate them?" Id. at 404-06.
Douglas concluded that "Bloch never raised the point because the Communist consensus
of that day was that it was best for the cause that the Rosenbergs pay the extreme price."
W.O. DOUGLAS, supra note 8, at 79. Radosh and Milton conclude that it is plausible that
Bloch would rather "see his clients dead. . . than have them saved by the likes of [Edelman
and Farmer]." R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, supra note 9, at 407. They also suggest another
possible motive. If Farmer's petition succeeded, it would be impossible to deny Farmer access
to the Rosenbergs, who were on the brink of despair despite their outward show of defiance.
Farmer, who was not convinced of their innocence, might have suggested cooperating with
the government to save their lives.
For Bloch, any influence that might lead the Rosenbergs to consider confess-
ing was unthinkable, and for reasons that went deeper than any abstract de-
mands of the Party line. Confession would have meant naming others-most
likely many others, individuals who would then provide the fodder for a new
round to atom-spy trials-and, perhaps, provide also the excuse for the whole-
sale roundup of leftists that so many in Bloch's circle believed was imminent.
From this point of view, cooperation with the government could not possibly
"save" Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Rather, it would destroy them and every-
thing they had suffered for, in a sense that not even the electric chair could.
Id. at 409.
181 Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
182 The Court "discountenance[d]" the practice of next friend petitions as "more likely to
prejudice than to help the representation of accused persons in highly publicized cases." Id
at 292 (opinion of Jackson, J., joined by Vinson, C.J., and Reed, Burton, Clark, and Minton,
JJ.). It would hardly do, however, to let the Rosenbergs be executed on the ground the
Edelman lacked standing to raise a telling substantive issue. Thus, the decision formally
rested only on the ground that the Atomic Energy Act was irrelevant, and not on whether
Edelman had the necessary standing to raise the issue. Id at 294-96 (opinion of Clark, J.,
joined by Vinson, C.J., and Reed, Jackson, Burton, and Minton, JJ.).
183 Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 322 (1953) (per curiam). A motion to recon-
sider the question of the Court's power to vacate the stay was also denied. Rosenberg v.
United States, 346 U.S. 324 (1953) (per curiam).
184 R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, supra note 9, at 414.
185 Chief Justice Vinson's opinion for the Court was largely devoted to a chronology of
the proceedings of the case. On the merits, it merely adopted by reference the previously filed
opinions of Justices Jackson and Clark. It was not filed, however, until July 16. 346 U.S. at
277. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion was filed June 22, 346 U.S. at 301, commenting
that "writing an opinion in a case affecting two lives after the curtain has been rung down
upon them has the appearance of pathetic futility. But history also has its claims." Id. at 310.
A per curiam opinion, 346 U.S. at 288, the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson, 346 U.S. at
246
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The Court's major institutional failure in the Rosenberg cases oc-
curred in these few days. Earlier Court decisions refusing to review the
case turned on whether the case should be reviewed without reference to
the issues, or whether particular issues were sufficiently substantial.
Farmer's petition, however, raised an issue more substantial than any
previously presented on the Rosenbergs' behalf. Although the Court
did dispose of that issue on the merits after argument, the hasty
processes employed did not permit the Justices to weigh the argument
on its merits. The Court quickly rejected the argument not because it
lacked merit, but because further inquiry would have delayed the
Rosenbergs' scheduled execution.
Parrish's study, with its supporting documentation providing new
corroboration, underlines this conclusion. Although Justice Burton
eventually voted with the Court's majority, in the June 17 conference he
voted initially to schedule further argument on the Atomic Energy Act
issue. (Burton joined the Court's majority after only four Justices, in-
cluding Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas, voted for further argu-
ment.) '8 6 At no other time in the various Rosenberg cases had there been
four votes to identify any issue as sufficiently substantial to require argu-
ment. Although the Court disposed of the issue on the merits, Parrish
presents solid evidence to support Frankfurter's view that the Court's
majority had decided to let the execution proceed, no matter what issue
had been raised.
Chief Justice Vinson's opinion for the Court stated that the Atomic
Energy Act question had been "deliberated in conference for several
hours"'' 7 but Frankfurter's comment scribbled on the page proof of that
opinion angrily notes that there had been no discussion of the merits;
the entire discussion concerned the question whether the issue had been
waived.' 88 More telling are FBI documents, based on conversations
with Judge Kaufman, which report that Justice Jackson arranged a con-
ference with the Chief Justice and Attorney General Brownell to plan a
strategy to have Douglas's stay overturned.189 Even more striking than
289, the concurring opinion ofJustice Clark, 346 U.S. at 293, the dissenting opinion ofJustice
Black, 346 U.S. at 296, the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas, 346 U.S. at 310, and a brief
dissenting memorandum by Justice Frankfurter, 346 U.S. at 289, were all delivered on the
decision day, June 19.
186 Parrish, supra note 1, at 836. Douglas also confirms that Burton voted to keep the stay
in force pending further argument. W.O. DOUGLAS, supra note 8, at 81.
187 Rosenberg, 346 U.S. at 283.
188 Parrish, supra note 1, at 837. It will be recalled, too, that Farmer, the only attorney
arguing the merits of the Atomic Energy Act question in the Court's argument, had just 17
minutes of the defense time. See supra note 180.
189 Parrish, supra note 1, at 835 (citing Memorandum from A.H. Belmont to D.M. Ladd
(June 17, 1953) (available in The Kaufman Papers, distributed by the National Committee to
Re-Open the Rosenberg Case)).
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the fact that this extraordinary meeting took place, 190 is that it occurred
on June 16, the day before Douglas granted the stay! At that meeting,
Jackson told the Attorney General that "the whole theory of listening to
Farmer's motion was ridiculous and Douglas should have turned it
down."' 9 1 Vinson promised that if Douglas granted a stay, he would
call the Court into session to overturn the stay. 192
Parrish also suggests that in the Rosenbergs' last days, Frankfurter's
antipathy toward Douglas affected his crusade to have their convictions
reviewed. 193 Despite the fact that less than twenty-four hours separated
his receipt of Farmer's application and his issuance of the stay, Douglas
did not work in isolation. As Circuit Justice, his responsibility was to
decide whether the issue raised by Farmer at this late date would attract
the votes of enough Justices to schedule further hearings in the case. 194
If he were sure that it would not, he could not responsibly grant the
stay, regardless of his own views. 195 Frankfurter's own memorandum
shows that Douglas talked to Chief Justice Vinson, and reported to
Frankfurter that Vinson thought that the Atomic Energy Act issue had
been disposed of in the appeal of the Rosenbergs' original conviction.' 96
Douglas also talked to Black, showed him his draft opinion issuing the
stay, and received strong support. Douglas approached Frankfurter be-
cause he knew that Frankfurter had previously attempted to influence
the positions of Justices Burton and Jackson.' 9 7 Douglas asked whether
190 Surprisingly, Parrish does not comment on the judicial ethics of this expart meeting.
In a footnote, he does indicate that there were ethical problems in Judge Kaufman's unilat-
eral discussions with the prosecution concerning the sentence. Parrish, supra note 1, at 811-12
n.21.
191 Id. at 835 (citing Memorandum from A.H. Belmont, supra note 189).
192 Id.
193 See supra note 120.
194 Accordingly, he denied the stay application presented by the Rosenberg defense team
on the ground that it "does not present points substantially different from those which the
Court has already considered in its several decisions. . . . Although I have the power to
grant a stay, I could not do so responsibly on grounds the Court has already rejected." 346
U.S. at 314.
195 Parrish concludes that Douglas acted responsibly in granting the stay, but states that
"Douglas. . .knew before he issued the stay that his performance did not have the support
of either the chief justice or a majority of the Court." Parrish, supra note 1, at 834. The
statement is unexceptionable only if interpreted to mean that Douglas knew on the basis of
conversations that he did not have a clear commitment from a majority to uphold his action.
Parrish also asserts that "[l]egally, his position was strong; politically and morally, however,
Douglas now functioned in a vacuum without the support of most of his colleagues." Id
Taken in context, that sentence should be read not to say that Douglas's own behavior lacked
moral support but to say that he did not receive moral support from any of the Justices, with
the exception of Justice Black.
196 Id Vinson is said to have believed that the death penalty issue was the same as the
question whether federal appellate judges had the power to revise a sentence, which had been
before the Court on the Rosenbergs' first petition for certiorari. See supra text accompanying
notes 68-77.
197 R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, supra note 9, at 401; Parrish, supra note 1, at 834.
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Frankfurter knew how Jackson stood on the matter, and whether Jack-
son and Burton should be consulted. 198
Parrish characterizes Frankfurter's reply as showing "icy neutral-
ity."' 99 Frankfurter reported that he refused to read a draft of the
Douglas opinion, and told him that "Tete-a-tete conversation cannot
settle this." His.only reassurance to Douglas was the admonition to "Do
...what your conscience tells you, not what the Chief Justice tells
you.''2°° On earlier occasions Frankfurter had not hesitated to work the
corridors in an effort to garner the votes needed to provide Supreme
Court review for the Rosenbergs, but he refused to do so now. 20'
Sometime following the Court's June 15 conference, Frankfurter re-
ported a conversation, in which he and Jackson agreed that Douglas
had been grandstanding all along: voting to review only when he could
be sure that a particular application ultimately would be denied.20 2
Jackson and Frankfurter talked about the Rosenberg case on June 16,
when Douglas was working on the stay petition, and Frankfurter re-
ported that Jackson had no objection to Douglas's entertaining the
Farmer motion.20 3 It is possible that Frankfurter and Jackson shared
their mutual view of Douglas's behavior in this same conversation. If so,
it is also possible that Frankfurter's views reinforced Jackson's view that
Douglas would not behave responsibly, prompting Jackson to call the
meeting with Vinson and Brownell to make sure that the stay would be
overturned.
Thus, Frankfurter may have contributed to the forces that would
ensure that Douglas's stay would be set aside without a fair hearing. His
active dislike for Douglas pulled him in a direction that contradicted
and defeated his desire for Supreme Court review of the Rosenbergs'
cases. Frankfurter did not report that he took any action to sound out
Justice Burton, and he clearly did not support Douglas's possible grant-
ing of the stay in conversations with Jackson. Joseph Rauh, Jr., with
whom Frankfurter spent the night prior to the Court's argument on
June 18, recalls that Frankfurter spent "a restless night and had harsh
words for Douglas. '20 4
CONCLUSION
Parrish's account of the Supreme Court's treatment of the Rosenberg
198 R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, supra note 9, at 401; Parrish, supra note 1, at 834.
199 Parrish, supra note 1, at 834.
200 Id. (quoting F. Frankfurter, supra note 6).
201 See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
202 See Parrish, supra note 1, at 825 ("In the hallway outside the conference room, Jackson
stopped Frankfurter and said triumphantly with reference to Justice Douglas, 'That S.O.B.'s
bluff was called.' "); see also supra note 121 and supra text accompanying note 157.
203 Parrish, supra note 1, at 835.
204 Id at 835 n.84.
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cases is heavily influenced by Felix Frankfurter's view of events as ex-
pressed in his memorandum. That memorandum tells us more about
Justice Frankfurter, however, than it does about the pattern of Justice
Douglas's votes in the Rosenberg cases. Douglas's voting pattern was not
erratic, mysterious, or self-serving. Quite simply, Douglas voted on the
merits of the issues presented, without reference to the public clamor
either to save the Rosenbergs, or to execute them. He followed that
course to the end, when his vote to grant a stay of execution showed the
courage and conviction for which he is best remembered.
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APPENDIX
THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE ROsENBERG CASE
Aug. 17, 1950:
April 5, 1951:
Feb. 25, 1952:
April 8, 1952:
Oct. 13, 1952:
Nov. 17, 1952:
Dec. 10, 1952:
Dec. 31, 1952:
May 25, 1953:
May 26, 1953:
June 1 and
June 8, 1953:
June 5 and
June 11, 1953:
June 2, 1953:
June 15, 1953:
June 15, 1953:
June 15, 1953:
June 17, 1953:
Rosenbergs indicted for violation of the Espio-
nage Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. §§ 32(a), 34 (1982).
Rosenbergs convicted and sentenced to death.
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirms the
convictions.
Second Circuit denies petition for rehearing.
United States Supreme Court denies certiorari;
Douglas votes to deny certiorari.
Supreme Court denies petition for rehearing.
District court denies motion to vacate judgment
and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1982).
Second Circuit affirms the district court's denial
of the motion to vacate judgment and sentence.
Supreme Court denies certiorari to review the
motion. Douglas votes to grant certiorari and
dissents from the denial of certiorari.
Petition filed in Supreme Court for a stay of
execution pending consideration of a petition for
rehearing. Petition denied by the Chief Justice.
Two further motions brought in district court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate judgment
and sentences. Motions denied.
Denials affirmed by the court of appeals.
Second Circuit denies petition for mandamus to
direct sentencing judge to resentence the defend-
ants.
Supreme Court denies petition for rehearing of
its May 25, 1953, denial of certiorari. Douglas
dissents.
Supreme Court denies an application for stay of
execution pending review of the June 1 and June
8, 1953, lower court decisions. Douglas votes
against the stay.
Supreme Court denies petition for an original
writ of habeas corpus with a request for a stay.
Douglas votes against issuance of the writ.
Douglas denies request for a stay.
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June 17, 1953:
June 18, 1953:
June 18, 1953:
June 19, 1953:
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Douglas grants a second request for a stay based
on new arguments. He denies an application for
habeas corpus.
Supreme Court special term vacates Douglas's
stay.
Supreme Court denies motion for a further stay
in order to seek executive clemency.
Rosenbergs executed.
